

DIRECT DEMOCRACY & SORTITION ASSEMBLIES

A Civic Architecture for the British Isles

DDSA-CPF-001 | Edition 2.0

Civic Policing Framework — Edition 2

Policing by civic compact — accountable, proportionate, and grounded in the consent of the communities it serves Second Edition — incorporating and superseding DDSA-POL-NBI-001

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"We inherit the lessons of the past, not its chains."

— DD&SA Founding Principle

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EXECUTIVE SYNTHESIS

The Civic Policing Framework (DDSA-CPF-001) establishes the complete architecture of policing in the Civic Commonwealth of the British Isles. This Second Edition consolidates into a single authoritative instrument the whole institutional life of the service — its constitutional foundation, its powers, its intelligence-to-evidence architecture, and the recruitment, training, pay, welfare, organisation, public-order and anti-drift provisions that govern its day-to-day existence. It supersedes and retires the separate Policing Framework for the New British Isles (DDSA-POL-NBI-001), whose substance is absorbed in full below.

The Framework addresses four interrelated problems simultaneously. The first is structural: what does policing look like in a society premised on resident sovereignty, non-punitive logic, and sortition-based governance? The second is operational: how do the Civic Policing Service and the Internal Security Department (ISD) work together without either contaminating the other — specifically, how does intelligence gathered covertly under a Magister Warrant become admissible evidence in a transparent civic justice process, without destroying the intelligence source, corrupting the prosecution, or denying the accused a fair hearing? The third is institutional: how is the service recruited, trained, paid, structured, and held to standard so that the constitutional design survives contact with operational reality? The fourth is adversarial: how does this architecture withstand the most sophisticated legal, political, and institutional challenges that the powerful, the well-resourced, and the determined can mount against it?

This Framework answers all four problems. On the first: policing in the NBI is a civic service, not a force. Officers serve residents rather than enforcing state authority upon them. Every power held by a Civic Policing Officer is specifically authorised, precisely bounded, and subject to independent oversight. On the second: the Framework establishes the Intelligence Referral and Evidential Isolation Protocol (IREIP) — a mechanism specifically designed to allow intelligence-derived investigations to produce admissible evidence without parallel construction, source exposure, or fair-trial compromise. On the third: the Framework specifies a complete institutional architecture — open recruitment, independent psychological screening, a structured training curriculum, transparent civic pay, enforceable officer welfare, a flat functional grade structure, and a five-year unit-renewal cycle. On the fourth: the Framework builds adversarial testing in as a design principle, not an afterthought.

The governance design is deliberately layered. Sortition Assemblies are the democratic layer: they set the operational mandate, ratify uses of force above the minimum threshold, determine outcomes in cases of serious harm, hear misconduct, and may dissolve units entirely. The Magister system and the Civic Policing Oversight Commission (CPOC) are the operational-judicial layer: Magisters authorise specific coercive acts — warrants, detention extensions, disclosure rulings — and the CPOC holds real-time read access to the complete operational record. The clean fit is this: Assemblies own the service; Magisters authorise specific coercive acts; the CPOC watches the record. Authority flows from residents through their Assemblies; each individual exercise of significant power is independently authorised; and the entire record is visible in real time.

The result is a policing architecture that is simultaneously more capable than its predecessor — because it is trusted, community-embedded, and constitutionally coherent — and more robustly accountable than anything that has existed in the British Isles. A Civic Policing Officer who abuses their powers does so in the certain knowledge that every action is recorded, every warrant is

Magister-authorised, every use of force is Assembly-reviewable, and every prosecution is subject to a disclosure architecture that will expose procedural misconduct. The accountability is not a constraint on effective policing — it is the condition that makes policing legitimate, and therefore effective.

PART I — CONSTITUTIONAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION

Section 1: Constitutional Basis and the Policing Compact

1.1 The Nature of Civic Policing

Policing in the NBI is founded on a civic compact rather than a command relationship. The compact is as follows: Civic Policing Officers (CPOs) are residents who have taken on a specific civic role — the application of the minimum force and authority necessary to maintain safety, investigate harm, and bring those responsible for harm into the Civic Justice process. In exchange for that authority, CPOs accept the most stringent accountability obligations in the civic architecture, because the powers they hold are the most capable of causing harm when misused.

This compact is not a rhetorical device. It is structurally embedded in the architecture: CPOs hold specific, enumerated powers — not general authority; every use of significant power generates a mandatory NIN record; every CPO is subject to continuous ethics assessment; the Civic Policing Oversight Commission (CPOC) has real-time access to the complete operational record of every policing action; and the Sortition Assembly system sets the mandate within which all of this operates and can withdraw it. A police force that holds power by institutional inheritance, that defines its own powers through operational practice, and that investigates its own misconduct is incompatible with the NBI constitutional order.

1.2 The Borrowed-Authority Principle

All police authority within the NBI is borrowed, not owned. It is temporary, not permanent. It is conditional, not assumed. These are not aspirational statements; they are structural facts of the system's design. Police authority is entirely defined, limited, reviewed, and — where necessary — revoked by Sortition Assemblies. No officer, unit, or institutional structure may claim authority beyond the specific, time-bound mandate granted to it. Police may act; they may never determine outcomes.

This principle governs every level of the service, from the individual officer making a judgement call during an incident to the senior leadership overseeing a regional operation. The moment any part of the service begins to act as though its authority is inherent rather than borrowed, it is acting outside its civic mandate and is subject to immediate review and sanction. In any case of ambiguity — whether concerning the scope of police authority, the meaning of a Civic Rule, or the appropriate response to an unforeseen circumstance — the interpretation that maximises resident authority and minimises police discretion prevails. This is an absolute rule, not subject to operational override, institutional preference, or emergency exception.

1.3 Historical Context: What This Framework Rejects

The policing architectures of the British Isles prior to the NBI were shaped by historical forces that are incompatible with the civic constitutional order. The English and Welsh model combined extraordinary legal powers (accumulated through the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, the Investigatory Powers Act, and dozens of further statutes) with structural accountability deficits: police forces that self-investigated misconduct, complaint systems without real powers, and an intelligence–law enforcement interface so compromised by informal practice that parallel construction — fabricating the legal discovery trail of intelligence-derived investigations — became operationally routine.

The Metropolitan Police's history of institutional racism (documented by the Macpherson Report, 1999, and the Casey Review, 2023), the Special Branch's decades of political surveillance of trade unionists, activists, and civic organisations, the systematic contamination of prosecutions through undisclosed intelligence, and the use of undercover officers in relationships with those they were investigating — all of these represent structural failures of architecture, not simply individual misconduct. This Framework addresses the architecture. Individual misconduct is addressed by the consequence pathways. Both are necessary.

The Scottish, Northern Irish, and Channel Islands policing traditions each offer elements of better practice — community policing models, different approaches to discretion, alternative prosecution frameworks. This Framework incorporates the strongest elements of each while resolving their common failure: the absence of a constitutional framework that makes accountability structural rather than aspirational.

1.4 The Non-Punitive Logic Applied to Policing

The DD&SA non-punitive principle holds that rule-breaking is a system failure, not primarily a moral failure of the individual. This principle does not mean that harmful conduct has no consequences — it means that the consequences are restorative and structural rather than retributive and personal. Applied to policing, this produces a specific operational orientation: CPOs are not agents of punishment. Their role is to stop harm, investigate its causes, preserve evidence, and bring the process to the Civic Justice Architecture where the restorative response is determined. CPOs who use the powers of their office to punish, humiliate, or cause unnecessary harm to individuals are themselves causing harm and are subject to the same restorative consequence architecture.

This orientation has practical implications for how CPOs engage with residents. It does not mean that arrest powers, physical restraint, or detention do not exist — they do, and they are specified in Part III. It means that every exercise of those powers is assessed against a non-punitive standard: was this the minimum coercion necessary to achieve the legitimate civic aim? A CPO who uses more force than necessary, detains longer than necessary, or treats the subject of an investigation with contempt has departed from the civic compact.

1.5 The Three-Tier Civic Safety Mandate

The mandate of the service is expressly civic, grounded in the contract between the residents of the British Isles and the institutions they have created to serve them. Officers are civic practitioners, not enforcers; their legitimacy derives from their alignment with the interests of the communities they serve, not from institutional badge or rank. The mandate reduces to three tiers of obligation.

Prevention. The primary obligation is to prevent harm before it occurs. This requires active presence in communities, constructive relationships with residents, and an orientation toward early intervention rather than reactive enforcement. Prevention is not a secondary or administrative function — it is the core purpose of the service and should absorb the majority of officer effort and institutional resource.

Response. Where harm is occurring or imminent, officers respond with speed, competence, and proportionality. Response duty requires physical presence, decisive stabilisation, and the protection of all persons involved — including those who may have caused harm. Response is bounded: it ends when the immediate danger is contained. Officers do not extend their presence or authority beyond what the safety situation requires.

Evidence. Following any serious incident, officers gather factual evidence thoroughly and impartially. That evidence is not shaped by prosecutorial intent and is not curated to support a predetermined conclusion. It is a complete, honest account of what occurred, who was involved, what the state of risk is, and what the available facts indicate. The service's role in this respect is precisely defined: it gathers and presents evidence; it does not advise on outcomes, advocate for particular consequences, or shape the framing within which an Assembly considers a case. It provides facts, completely and honestly, and then its role concludes.

Section 2: Civic Policing Service — Structure and Governance

2.1 The Civic Policing Service

The Civic Policing Service (CPS) replaces all legacy police forces operating in the British Isles — including the Metropolitan Police, Police Scotland, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and all other territorial forces — in a single, constitutionally coherent body. The CPS is organised on a locally accountable model: local community policing teams are embedded within each Community Assembly area, regional coordination capabilities are deployable across local areas where a situation exceeds local capacity, and a small number of genuinely national specialist functions exist where local or regional structures cannot meet the need. This structure reflects the DD&SA principle that authority flows from communities upward, not from central institutions downward.

The CPS is not a military body and has no military command structure. Ranks are replaced by civic role titles that reflect function rather than hierarchy (specified in full at Section 2.6). The internal culture of the CPS is designed around the civic compact: every CPO understands that their authority derives from the resident body and is exercised on the resident body's behalf.

2.2 The Sortition Assembly Governance Layer

The CPS is, in all things and at all times, subordinate to the Sortition Assembly system. There is no authority above the sortition process within the NBI. No officer, unit, or institutional structure may act against the determination of a relevant Assembly, resist its inquiry, withhold information from its proceedings, or seek to influence its composition. Sortition Assemblies exercise the following powers over policing:

- Define the operational mandate and jurisdictional limits of police units
- Set local safety priorities and allocate police resource accordingly
- Ratify all uses of force above the minimum threshold
- Determine outcomes in all cases of serious harm where police have gathered evidence
- Investigate and adjudicate all complaints of police misconduct

- Remove individual officers, suspend units, or dissolve forces entirely
- Revise, restrict, or expand police powers within constitutional limits
- Commission independent reviews of police culture, practice, and institutional behaviour

Three tiers of oversight Assembly operate. Local Sortition Assemblies, convened at community and district level, are the primary oversight body for day-to-day policing within their area: they review unit performance and conduct, set local priorities, hear community-level complaints, and approve or decline requests for extended powers within the locality. Regional Sortition Assemblies coordinate policing matters that cross local boundaries or involve threats operating at scale — coordinated harm across multiple localities, investigations exceeding local capacity, organised crime, or significant police failures requiring review at scale. Independent Sortition Review Assemblies are convened specifically and exclusively to address police misconduct: they are selected by lot from the civic population, exclude all serving or former police personnel, and dissolve on the conclusion of each case, so that review cannot be captured by institutional interests.

2.3 The Operational-Judicial Layer: Magisters and the CPOC

Beneath the democratic mandate set by Assemblies, the authorisation of specific coercive acts and the continuous oversight of the operational record fall to the Magister system and the Civic Policing Oversight Commission. This is the second layer of the governance design, and it sits inside the limits the Assemblies set rather than competing with them. Magisters authorise specific coercive acts — search warrants, detention extensions, surveillance and undercover authorisations, and disclosure rulings — each on its own articulable grounds. The CPOC monitors the complete record.

The Civic Policing Oversight Commission (CPOC) is the permanent independent oversight body for the CPS. It is staffed through sortition, reports to the National Sortition Assembly, and has real-time read access to the NIN Policing Record (NIN-PR) — the complete operational record of all CPS activity. The CPOC is not a complaints body — it is a structural oversight body. It monitors patterns of policing conduct across the entire CPS for systemic problems, not individual incidents alone. Its structural access to real-time policing records is its most important feature. Legacy oversight bodies — the Independent Office for Police Conduct, His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary — investigated incidents after they occurred, with access to evidence the police themselves had compiled. The CPOC sees the record as it is made, cannot be denied access to any record, and identifies patterns before they become systemic.

The relationship between the two layers is precise. Where this Framework requires Magister authorisation for a coercive act — for example, a detention extension — that authorisation operates inside the limits and priorities set by the relevant Assembly. Where an Assembly determines an outcome in a harm case, it does so on the evidence the CPS has gathered and the Magister system has tested for integrity. Assemblies own the service; Magisters authorise specific coercive acts; the CPOC watches the record. No single body holds unchecked authority over any resident's liberty.

2.4 The NIN Policing Record (NIN-PR)

All CPS activity — every stop-and-account, every arrest, every detention, every search, every use of force, every investigation action, every piece of evidence gathered — is recorded on the NIN Policing Record (NIN-PR). The NIN-PR is a public-access system, not a classified one. Subject to individual privacy protections for suspects and victims, all NIN-PR records are visible to any NBI resident through the NIN public portal. The CPS operates in a glass house by design. The Civic Transparency Register and the Civic Memory Register — the public stop record and the permanent misconduct record respectively — are published views drawn from this single underlying record.

The NIN-PR operates on a write-once architecture identical to the NIN-SIN: records are made once and cannot be amended, deleted, or altered. Corrections are made by new write-once entries linked to the original. The transparency of the NIN-PR is the primary deterrent to policing misconduct: an officer who abuses their powers does so in a record that is visible in real time to the CPOC, to the Magister system, to the relevant Assembly, and to any NBI resident who chooses to look.

2.5 CPS Staffing Principles and Ethics Architecture

CPS officers are recruited through an open, advertised process with clear competency requirements (specified in full at Part X). Unlike the legacy model, CPS recruitment does not screen for "command presence" or physical dominance — it screens for emotional intelligence, community understanding, ethical reasoning capacity, and practical problem-solving. Physical fitness standards exist for roles requiring them, but physical capacity is not conflated with professional suitability.

All CPOs complete the DD&SA Civic Policing Ethics Programme (CPEP) and the initial training programme before deployment — not a one-week induction, but a structured programme combining practical training with sustained engagement with the civic constitutional architecture, restorative justice practice, community embedding, and the specific legal framework governing their powers. CPOs who cannot demonstrate ethical reasoning capacity at the end of training are not deployed. Five ethics principles apply to all CPS operations, parallel to those of the security services:

- Minimum Necessary Force — every coercive action uses only the minimum force or authority necessary to achieve the legitimate civic aim
- Impartiality — no CPO action is motivated by the personal characteristics, beliefs, or associations of the resident involved
- Legality — every CPO action has an explicit, specific legal basis in this Framework
- Accountability — every significant CPO action is recorded on the NIN-PR at the time it occurs
- Community Service — the CPO's primary orientation is service to the resident community, not enforcement against it

2.6 Grade and Role Structure

The CPS operates a simplified, non-hierarchical grade structure designed to resist the institutional self-importance and career-politics that tend to accumulate in complex rank systems. The grade structure reflects operational function, not institutional status. There are no honorary ranks, no ceremonial grades, and no distinction of uniform beyond functional necessity.

- Civic Policing Officer (CPO) — entry level. Responsible for community presence, prevention work, and first response. The majority of police work is done at this level. The CPO is the warranted officer of the service.

- Civic Investigation Officer (CIO) — experienced officers who lead evidence-gathering operations and may coordinate multi-officer responses to serious incidents.
- Civic Safety Lead (CSL) — responsible for unit leadership and Assembly liaison, and accountable to the Assembly for the conduct and performance of their unit. There is a maximum ratio of one CSL per ten officers.
- Specialist Practitioner (SP) — officers with recognised specialist capabilities (firearms, cybercrime, child protection, mental-health response, forensics). Grade is function-specific, not hierarchical: a Specialist Practitioner in cybercrime has no authority over a CSL in general operations.

Alongside the warranted grades, the CPS deploys Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) — non-warranted, non-enforcement roles embedded in Community Assembly areas. CLOs are the primary face of the CPS in most interactions with most residents, most of the time. They are not police officers in the traditional sense and cannot arrest, detain, search, or use force. They provide a visible, accessible, trusted civic presence that connects residents with the CPS, with civic support services, and with early intervention resources before harm occurs or escalates. (The non-warranted liaison role is termed the Community Liaison Officer throughout this Edition; readers of earlier instruments should note that this replaces both the "Community Safety Officer" of the First Edition and the "Civic Safety Officer" entry grade of the retired POL-NBI-001, eliminating the previous acronym collision on "CSO".)

PART II — CIVIC POLICING POWERS

Section 3: Enumerated Powers of Civic Policing Officers

3.1 The Enumeration Principle

CPOs hold only those powers specifically listed in this Framework. This is not a common-law model in which general powers exist subject to specific limitations — it is a constitutional model in which no power exists unless specifically granted. The burden of justification falls on the exercise of power, not on its absence. A CPO who cannot identify a specific provision of this Framework authorising a specific action may not take that action.

Each power listed below is accompanied by: the specific trigger conditions that must be met before the power may be exercised; the specific limits on how the power may be exercised; the recording obligation that applies; and the review mechanism through which the exercise of the power is assessed. Powers without defined trigger conditions are not powers — they are blank cheques. This Framework issues no blank cheques. The general limits of action are absolute: officers may not punish any person under any circumstances; detention is never indefinite; emergencies confer no additional powers; and officers may not act in any domain outside their defined operational mandate.

3.2 Stop and Account

A CPO may stop a resident or visitor to the NBI and ask them to account for their presence or behaviour where the CPO has specific, articulable grounds for believing that account may reveal relevant information about an identified harm or imminent harm. "Specific articulable grounds" means the CPO must be able to state — on the NIN-PR record, at the time — the specific observation, intelligence, or information that led to the stop. "I was suspicious" is not articulable grounds. "I observed this person attempting to enter a secured area at 0300 having been seen at the same location on three previous nights" is. Grounds may never be constructed from protected characteristics including, but not limited to, ethnicity, sex, age, disability, religion, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic presentation. Any stop conducted on such a basis is unlawful and constitutes automatic misconduct.

Stop and account is not a power of compulsion — the resident is not required to answer. The CPO must inform the resident immediately that they are not obliged to answer and are free to leave at any time. If the resident does not wish to answer and wishes to leave, they may do so. A stop and account that becomes a detention against the resident's will requires arrest powers (Section 3.3).

Every stop and account is recorded on the NIN-PR within 30 minutes of the stop, whether or not the resident provided any information. The record includes the time, location, and duration of the stop; the specific grounds; the outcome; and the self-identified demographic information of the resident if they choose to provide it. Aggregate stop and account data by geographic area, time period, and demographic is published on the NIN public portal monthly through the Civic Transparency Register. Any pattern of stops disproportionately targeting residents on the basis of protected characteristics triggers automatic CPOC review.

3.3 Power of Arrest

A CPO may arrest a resident or visitor where both of the following conditions are met. Condition A: the CPO has specific, articulable grounds for believing that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a Notifiable Harm (as defined in the NBI Civic Rules). Condition B: arrest is necessary because the individual's identity cannot be established; or there is specific reason to believe the individual will cause further harm or leave the jurisdiction before investigation can proceed; or the harm alleged is of sufficient gravity that immediate protective action is required to prevent escalation.

Both conditions must be met. Arrest on Condition A alone — because an offence may have occurred — is not sufficient. The necessity element (Condition B) must be independently established and recorded at the time of arrest. On arrest, CPOs must immediately and clearly inform the individual that they are under arrest; the specific reason for the arrest in plain language; that they have the right to a Civic Advocate; that they are not required to answer questions; and that they will be taken to a Civic Custody Centre. These obligations are not discharged by reciting a formula — the CPO must ensure the individual has actually understood, making reasonable adjustments for language, disability, or other need.

3.4 Powers of Search

Consensual Search

A CPO may search a person, vehicle, or premises with the free and informed consent of the person or owner. Consent must be actively given — absence of objection is not consent. The individual must be informed of what is being searched for and why before consent is sought. Consent may be withdrawn at any time and the search must stop immediately on withdrawal. A consent search and its outcome are recorded on the NIN-PR.

Search Incident to Arrest

On lawful arrest, a CPO may search the arrested person for items that may be used to cause injury, items that may facilitate escape, and items directly relevant to the reason for arrest. Search incident to arrest is limited to what is necessary for the specific purposes listed — it is not a general authority to search everything the arrested person has. Items found during a search incident to arrest that are unrelated to any of the three purposes may not be seized without a separate Magister-issued seizure order.

Magister Search Warrant

To search a premises or vehicle not subject to the above provisions, a CPO must obtain a Magister Search Warrant. The warrant application must specify the premises or vehicle to be searched; the specific items being sought; the specific grounds for believing those items are on the premises; and the relevance of those items to a specific identified harm. The Magister may grant, grant with conditions, or refuse. All warrant applications and decisions are recorded on the NIN-PR. A refused warrant application cannot simply be re-submitted to a different Magister — refusal is recorded and the grounds for the original refusal must be addressed in any resubmission.

3.5 Powers of Detention

Pre-charge detention is the most significant routine power available to the CPS. It removes a resident's liberty without conviction or even charge. The NBI architecture treats pre-charge detention as an exceptional measure requiring continuous justification, not a routine investigative tool. Detention is initiated only on identifiable safety or investigative grounds, is formally notified to the responsible Local Sortition Assembly, and expires by default unless actively renewed.

Initial Detention Period

Following arrest, a CPO may detain the individual at a Civic Custody Centre for an initial period not exceeding 12 hours. During this period, the individual must be offered a Civic Advocate; notification of a person of their choosing; access to appropriate food, water, rest, and medical care; and access to any religious or cultural needs they identify. Detention is not permitted for the purpose of conducting interviews — interviews require the active cooperation of the individual or a separate, specific investigation power. Silence cannot be used as grounds for extending detention. The fact of any detention is notified to the responsible Local Sortition Assembly within two hours of commencement.

Extended Detention — Magister Authorisation Within Assembly Limits

Where initial investigation cannot be completed within 12 hours, extension requires Magister authorisation, exercised within the limits set by the relevant Assembly. The Magister reviews the specific grounds for extension — what investigation is being conducted, why it cannot be completed, and why the individual's release would compromise it. Maximum extension periods are: 24 hours (Magister authorisation); 48 hours (Senior Magister authorisation, available only for the most serious harm categories); and 96 hours absolute maximum (National SA Investigative Magister panel, available only in cases involving imminent threat to multiple lives or national-security-linked serious harm under the CNSDF architecture). Every extension decision is a new Magister assessment — not a rubber-stamp continuation of the previous — and is re-reviewed at no greater than 12-hour intervals. If the investigative grounds have not advanced in the intervening period, extension is refused. The default disposition at every review is release; continued detention must be actively justified and is never assumed to continue.

3.6 Powers of Entry

Entry onto private premises without the owner's consent requires either a Magister Search Warrant (Section 3.4); an Emergency Entry Power; or specific statutory authority under this Framework for defined circumstances such as welfare checks or hot pursuit.

Emergency Entry Power

Where a CPO has specific, articulable grounds for believing that a person on the premises is in immediate danger of serious harm and delay in obtaining a warrant would result in that harm occurring, the CPO may enter without warrant. Emergency entry must be recorded on the NIN-PR within 30 minutes. A retrospective Magister review of every emergency entry is conducted within 24 hours — not to validate the entry (it has already occurred) but to assess whether the power was properly exercised. Emergency entry that fails the retrospective review generates a CPOC referral.

Welfare Entry

Where a CPO has specific reason to believe that a resident at a specific address may be unable to request assistance due to health crisis, injury, or other incapacitating circumstance, the CPO may enter to conduct a welfare check. Welfare entry is the most limited entry power: the CPO may not search the premises and may not seize items. They may assess and assist the resident and call for any necessary emergency services. All welfare entries are recorded on the NIN-PR.

3.7 Use of Force

The use of force is the most ethically serious power available to a CPO. The NBI architecture treats force as a last resort requiring subsequent justification in every case, not a first option requiring subsequent justification only when something goes wrong. Force is permitted only where all three of the following conditions are satisfied simultaneously: the use of force is necessary to prevent immediate, specific harm to an identifiable person or persons; no non-physical alternative is available that would achieve the same safety outcome; and the degree of force applied is the minimum that could reasonably be expected to prevent the harm in question. Force used outside these three conditions is unlawful regardless of the outcome of the incident.

The Graduated Force Framework

CPOs are trained in and must follow the Graduated Force Framework (GFF), which requires that force be escalated through the following levels only when each preceding level has been tried and failed or is clearly inapplicable: Level 1, Presence and Communication; Level 2, Soft Physical Control (guiding contact, non-restraint physical direction); Level 3, Restraint (physical restraint techniques designed to control without injury); Level 4, Intermediate Force (authorised non-lethal tools such as baton or incapacitant spray, where restraint has failed and serious harm is imminent); and Level 5, Lethal Force (available only in the specific circumstances in Section 3.7.1).

Every use of force above a minimum threshold — defined as any physical contact intended to restrain, redirect, or subdue a person — triggers an automatic review. A CPO who uses Level 4 or Level 5 force must file a Use of Force Report on the NIN-PR within one hour of the incident, regardless of whether the individual has been injured. Body-worn camera footage is secured and reviewed within 24 hours, the review is conducted by an independent panel appointed by the relevant Sortition Assembly, and the outcome is publicly logged. Physical restraint is permitted solely to prevent immediate harm and may never be used punitively; any restraint technique that creates a risk of asphyxiation, cardiac stress, or positional harm is prohibited absolutely and without exception, and restraint must be released at the earliest moment consistent with safety.

3.7.1 Lethal Force — Absolute Conditions

A CPO may use lethal force only where all of the following conditions are simultaneously met: the CPO has specific, articulable grounds for believing that an individual poses an immediate threat of death or grievous bodily harm to a specific identifiable person or persons; no lesser force option is available that could reliably prevent that harm within the time available; and the use of lethal force is proportionate to the specific threat identified.

Lethal force may not be used as a first or early resort; in pursuit (unless the fleeing individual continues to pose an immediate lethal threat to others, not merely an escape risk); against individuals who are incapacitated, restrained, or no longer posing an immediate threat; or against crowds or groups on the basis of the conduct of one member. Every use of lethal force triggers an immediate mandatory review by a Magister, an automatic CPOC investigation, and referral to the Civic Justice Architecture. The CPO who used lethal force is suspended from active duty pending investigation — not as a punitive measure, but because the outcome of the investigation determines whether the use was lawful, and duty cannot continue in uncertainty.

3.8 Arming Framework

Officers of the CPS are unarmed by default. This is a foundational constitutional position, not an operational convenience. The NBI does not endorse a model of policing in which the routine presence of lethal weapons is normalised in civic interactions. The evidence from constitutional democracies worldwide indicates clearly that routine arming of police forces increases the frequency and severity of fatal incidents involving the public without producing corresponding safety gains.

All officers carry as standard: personal protective equipment appropriate to operational context; a body-worn camera, mandatory and operational at all times during public-facing duty; incapacitant spray (PAVA or equivalent), subject to training certification and reviewed deployment authority; rigid restraint cuffs; personal communication equipment; and a first aid kit appropriate to immediate trauma response. Conducted energy devices (Tasers) may only be carried and deployed by officers holding current specialist certification, require an active specific threat of serious harm where no

lesser alternative is available, an explicit verbal warning before deployment except where doing so would endanger the officer or a third party, immediate medical assessment of the individual following deployment, and automatic review of every deployment. Whether CED-certified officers are routinely deployed within an area is a local decision, determined by the Local Sortition Assembly in response to specific intelligence about threat levels.

Firearms may only be deployed by officers who are specifically trained, certified, and authorised under a live operational mandate issued by a Regional or Local Sortition Assembly. Firearms operations are never a routine deployment option; an independent Assembly mandate specific to the operation must be in force before any armed officer deploys; any discharge of a firearm triggers immediate suspension of the officer involved pending full independent review; all firearms operations are publicly reported within 48 hours; and fatalities involving police firearms are referred automatically to an Independent Sortition Review Assembly. A firearms capability exists because certain threat scenarios require it; its existence does not imply routine use, and any tendency toward normalisation of armed deployment is treated as institutional drift and subject to immediate correction.

3.9 Digital and Electronic Powers

The digital environment creates specific powers and specific constraints. CPOs do not have general authority to access digital devices, accounts, or records. The specific powers are: examination of a device with owner consent (consent must be freely given and withdrawal-capable; scope limited to what the individual consents to); examination of a device incident to arrest (limited to checking for content directly relevant to the specific reason for arrest, with no authority to examine all device contents); full device examination (requires a Magister Digital Evidence Warrant specifying the device, the specific content sought, and the investigative basis); access to cloud accounts, communications platforms, or third-party held data (requires a Magister Digital Evidence Warrant, with service providers required to comply with NIN-PR-recorded warrants within specified timescales); and real-time communications interception (requires both a Magister Digital Evidence Warrant and an ISD Magister Warrant, as this overlaps with security service powers — the dual-warrant requirement prevents the CPS from using security service capabilities without intelligence service involvement and separate judicial scrutiny).

3.10 Powers Regarding Children and Vulnerable Residents

Children (under 18) and residents with cognitive impairments, mental-health crises, or communication difficulties are subject to enhanced protections in all contact with the CPS. These are not discretionary adjustments — they are mandatory requirements:

- No child may be interviewed without an appropriate adult present — a parent, guardian, Civic Advocate, or trained appropriate-adult volunteer
- No child may be detained in standard custody — specialist Youth Civic Welfare Suites are required for all youth detentions, and any temporary custody of a child triggers immediate Local Sortition Assembly notification and requires Assembly authority to continue beyond two hours
- All interviews of children and vulnerable individuals are video-recorded in full, with the recording stored on the NIN-PR, and are conducted by specially trained officers in appropriate environments with a civic support representative present

- CPOs encountering residents in apparent mental-health crisis must prioritise Civic Mental Care consultation over enforcement action wherever the immediate safety of others permits
- No child is charged without a specific Magister review of the appropriateness of charges given the child's age and circumstances

Section 4: Forensic Evidence Architecture

4.1 The Civic Forensic Service

The Civic Forensic Service (CFS) is operationally independent of the Civic Policing Service. Forensic evidence — physical, biological, chemical, digital, documentary — is collected, analysed, and reported by the CFS, not by CPOs. This independence is architecturally essential: forensic evidence whose collection and analysis is controlled by the prosecuting party is structurally compromised before it is tendered. The CFS answers to the Civic Justice Architecture — specifically to the Magister who has oversight of the relevant proceedings — not to the CPS. Where an Assembly requires specialist interpretation of evidence, it appoints its own independent expert review; experts employed by or contracted to the CPS may not present evidence to Assemblies as independent witnesses.

The CFS operates to published, independently audited scientific standards. Its methods, protocols, error rates, and quality assurance procedures are published on the NIN public portal. Any technique that does not meet published scientific standards cannot be used as evidence in civic proceedings. The "forensic science" failures of the legacy system — including the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad fabrication scandal, the Damilola Taylor forensic errors, and the widespread use of probabilistic forensic techniques whose error rates were systematically understated to courts — are addressed by the independence, transparency, and auditable standards of the CFS.

4.2 Chain of Custody Architecture

Physical evidence is subject to a continuous, unbroken, NIN-PR-recorded chain of custody from the moment of collection to the moment of presentation in proceedings. Every person who handles a physical exhibit signs it in and out on the NIN-PR at the time of handling; records what they did with it and why; and confirms the integrity of the exhibit at transfer. Any gap in the chain of custody is disclosed to the defence and to the presiding Magister as a matter of obligation, not discretion. An exhibit with an unresolvable gap in its chain of custody is excluded from proceedings.

4.3 Digital Forensics — Write-Once Evidence Capture

Digital evidence is captured using write-once imaging protocols — creating bit-perfect copies of digital devices and storage media that cannot be altered. The imaging process itself is recorded on the NIN-PR, including the cryptographic hash of the captured image at the moment of capture. Any subsequent examination is conducted on the copy, not the original. The cryptographic hash provides an independently verifiable record that the examined copy is identical to the original capture. Tampering with a digital exhibit is detectable through hash verification and constitutes a serious civic justice integrity breach. All digital evidence must additionally meet the Civic Digital Evidence Standard: documented provenance, integrity verification, gathering without modification or selective extraction, and presentation to an Assembly in plain English accessible to lay residents.

4.4 DNA, Biometric, and Biological Evidence

The NBI maintains a Civic Forensic Database (CFD) for DNA, fingerprint, and biometric records, operating under strict rules designed to prevent the surveillance-state use of biometric data:

- DNA profiles of individuals found responsible for Notifiable Harms are retained for a period proportionate to the gravity of the harm, specified in the Civic Rules
- DNA profiles of individuals arrested but not charged, or charged but not found responsible, are deleted within 30 days of the conclusion of proceedings, unless a specific Magister retention order is made on specific public safety grounds
- No resident's DNA, fingerprints, or biometric data may be retained without either their consent or a Magister retention order
- The CFD is subject to annual sortition-panel audit, with findings published on the NIN public portal
- Mass collection of biometric data — facial recognition sweeps, bulk DNA sampling — is absolutely prohibited without a National SA vote and specific Magister oversight framework

4.5 Disclosure Obligations

The disclosure of all evidence — including evidence that assists the defence — is a constitutional obligation of the CPS, not a strategic choice. The NBI disclosure architecture is more rigorous than any legacy model:

- All material gathered in the course of an investigation that is relevant to the proceedings — whether it assists the prosecution or the defence — is disclosed to the defence Civic Advocate as a matter of obligation
- The CPS Disclosure Officer is responsible for identifying all relevant material and must certify in writing that disclosure is complete; false certification is a civic integrity failure
- The Civic Forensic Service produces all forensic results in full to both the CPS and the defence simultaneously — there is no CPS-first model
- Where the CPS believes that specific material should not be disclosed on public interest grounds (see Section 8), the matter is referred to a Magister for a Disclosure Ruling — the CPS may not unilaterally withhold material
- Material withheld under a Disclosure Ruling is reviewed by an Independent Evidence Counsel (Section 6.4.2) to confirm that the withholding is justified and not prejudicial to the fairness of proceedings

PART III — THE INTELLIGENCE-TO-EVIDENCE INTERFACE ARCHITECTURE

This Part is the architectural core of this Framework. The problem it addresses is one of the most technically difficult in the entire field of security law: how does a liberal democratic state use covertly gathered intelligence — obtained through methods that are not disclosed and from sources that cannot be named — to bring prosecutions that are fair, transparent, and capable of withstanding the most rigorous adversarial scrutiny? The answer requires a complete, end-to-end architecture. This Part provides it.

Section 5: The Problem Defined — Historical Failures and the Lessons They Teach

5.1 The Fundamental Tension

Intelligence work and legal proceedings operate on diametrically opposite principles. Intelligence work values secrecy: sources are protected, methods are concealed, assessments are provisional, and the evidentiary standards that apply to court proceedings — admissibility, confrontation, cross-examination — are structurally incompatible with how intelligence is gathered. Legal proceedings value transparency: the accused has the right to see and challenge the evidence against them, the source of every piece of evidence must be disclosed, and the reliability of evidence is tested through adversarial examination.

When a state attempts to use intelligence as evidence — or to allow intelligence to guide the gathering of evidence in ways that are not disclosed to the accused — it faces an insoluble dilemma if it has not built a proper architecture to resolve it. Disclose the intelligence fully and the source is burned, the method is exposed, and the intelligence architecture is degraded. Conceal the intelligence and the accused cannot properly challenge the basis of the case against them, rendering the proceedings fundamentally unfair. Legacy states have resolved this dilemma through a series of expedients that this Framework rejects categorically.

5.2 The Parallel Construction Problem

The most serious and most common abuse of the intelligence-to-evidence interface in legacy systems is parallel construction. Parallel construction occurs when law enforcement uses intelligence — gathered covertly, possibly unlawfully, in ways that cannot be disclosed — as a roadmap to build a legal case, and then fabricates or curates the legal discovery trail to conceal the intelligence origin of the investigation.

The US Drug Enforcement Administration's Special Operations Division, documented through Reuters investigations in 2013, routinely used signals intelligence to identify drug trafficking targets and then instructed law enforcement officers to recreate the discovery trail through ostensibly legal means — a traffic stop, a confidential informant, a border search — so that the intelligence origin was never disclosed in court. The targets' defence lawyers, judges, and juries never knew that the investigation had begun with covert surveillance that may itself have been unlawful.

Parallel construction is not a marginal abuse. It is the systematic corruption of the justice system by the intelligence system. It allows the state to avoid the warrant requirement, to avoid disclosure obligations, and to avoid fair-trial scrutiny, because the accused's lawyers do not know what to challenge. It has been used against drug traffickers, terrorists, and — in states without adequate constitutional protections — against political opponents, journalists, and civic activists.

5.3 Historical Models — Strengths and Failures

The US FISA Wall (pre-2001)

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act system maintained a legal wall between intelligence-gathering on foreign agents and criminal prosecution. The wall was intended to prevent intelligence from contaminating prosecutions. Its failure was twofold: it was dismantled after 2001 on the false premise that it had prevented intelligence sharing that could have stopped the attacks; and even before its dismantling, it was gamed through informal channels. The lesson: a wall maintained by procedure alone, without structural enforcement, will be circumvented. The NBI architecture uses structural separation — not procedural walls — as its primary mechanism.

The Canadian CSIS/RCMP Model

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service gathers intelligence; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police prosecutes; a formal referral protocol exists between them. In practice, the protocol has been compromised repeatedly: CSIS withheld from the RCMP intelligence that would have assisted the defence (the Arar Commission findings); the RCMP used CSIS intelligence products in ways that were not disclosed to courts (the Air India trial); and the two services developed informal relationships that bypassed the formal protocol entirely. The lesson: a referral protocol between two organisations with shared objectives and overlapping personnel is not sufficient. The NBI architecture adds structural separation of personnel, independent oversight of every referral, and a mandatory disclosure mechanism that operates automatically.

The UK Public Interest Immunity (PII) Regime

UK courts developed the Public Interest Immunity mechanism to allow the government to withhold sensitive material from disclosure on the grounds that disclosure would damage the public interest. In practice, PII has been used to conceal intelligence sources, to protect police misconduct (the Hillsborough inquests), and to shield government from embarrassment unrelated to genuine national security. The lesson: judicial review of withholding is essential, but the judicial process must see the withheld material — not merely the government's assertion about it — to make a meaningful assessment. The NBI architecture requires the Magister to read the intelligence before deciding on withholding, and requires an Independent Evidence Counsel to assess the prejudice to the defence.

The US Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)

CIPA provides a mechanism for managing classified information in US federal criminal trials, requiring the government to notify defendants of classified information it intends to use, allowing the court to review classified material in camera, and permitting substitution of unclassified summaries. CIPA is a genuine improvement over having no mechanism, but its weaknesses are instructive: substitution summaries can be so sanitised as to be useless; the security-cleared lawyer requirement creates access inequality; and CIPA is routinely used to force defendants to accept inadequate summaries or face abandonment of their case. The NBI architecture adopts CIPA's in camera review mechanism while addressing each of its specific weaknesses.

The Diplock Court Model (Northern Ireland)

From 1973, Northern Ireland operated a system of single-judge, non-jury trials for scheduled terrorist offences, on the grounds that jury intimidation made fair jury trial impossible. The model removed one form of injustice while creating another: the concentration of conviction authority in a single judge whose assessments were not subject to collective scrutiny. The lesson is not that non-jury trial is categorically wrong, but that single-judge trial without structural safeguards is as vulnerable to capture as jury trial in a hostile environment. The NBI architecture provides, for the most sensitive cases, a three-Magister panel rather than a single Magister, with mandatory adversarial oversight by an Independent Evidence Counsel.

The German Trennungsgebot (Separation Principle)

Germany's constitutional jurisprudence developed the Trennungsgebot — the principle of institutional separation between intelligence services and the police — out of the experience of the Gestapo, where a single body combining intelligence collection, arrest powers, and prosecutorial authority had enabled totalitarian control. The principle requires that intelligence services may not hold arrest powers and police may not conduct covert surveillance equivalent to intelligence-service operations. The NBI architecture adopts and extends this principle: the ISD has no arrest powers; the CPS has no covert surveillance powers beyond those specifically warranted; and the interface between them is the formally governed IREIP, not a merged operational relationship.

The Israeli Military Court Disclosure Practice

Israeli military courts developed the gist disclosure model — providing defendants with a summary of the classified evidence against them sufficient for them to understand and challenge the case, without disclosing the full intelligence. The model has significant weaknesses in the military-court context, where structural unfairness to defendants is well documented. However, the gist principle — that a defendant must receive enough information to mount a meaningful defence, even if not every intelligence detail — is sound and forms part of the NBI architecture in a significantly strengthened form.

The UK Special Advocate System

In Special Immigration Appeals Commission proceedings and certain terrorism-related cases, the UK has used Special Advocates — security-cleared lawyers who can see the classified material but cannot communicate its contents to the defendant. This model has been consistently criticised by the Special Advocates themselves, by the European Court of Human Rights, and by the Law Commission: a lawyer who cannot take instructions from their client is not effectively representing that client. The NBI architecture replaces the Special Advocate with an Independent Evidence Counsel whose role is specifically defined to avoid the conflict of interest inherent in the Special Advocate position.

Section 6: The Intelligence Referral and Evidential Isolation Protocol (IREIP)

6.1 The IREIP — Purpose and Foundational Principles

The Intelligence Referral and Evidential Isolation Protocol (IREIP) is the complete architectural mechanism through which intelligence gathered by the ISD may lawfully contribute to a CPS prosecution without contaminating the prosecution's evidential integrity, compromising the intelligence source, or denying the accused a fair hearing. It is built on three foundational principles derived from the historical analysis above:

- Structural separation: the intelligence and prosecution processes are physically and organisationally separated until and unless a Magister-governed disclosure decision connects them in a defined, recorded, and challengeable way
- Mandatory independent oversight: no element of the IREIP operates through bilateral agreement between the ISD and the CPS — every step requires independent Magister oversight or Independent Evidence Counsel assessment
- Fair trial primacy: where any element of the IREIP cannot be operated in a way consistent with the accused's right to a fair hearing, proceedings must be stayed, not continued on the basis of a compromised process

6.2 Stage 1 — The Referral Decision

Who Makes the Referral

Within the ISD, only the Director or Deputy Director (Operations) may authorise a referral to the CPS. Case officers and section heads identify referral candidates but do not make referrals; the Director-level authorisation requirement prevents referrals being made for operationally convenient rather than genuinely justified reasons. Within the CPS, only the Intelligence Liaison Officer (ILO) may receive a referral. The ILO is the sole point of contact between the ISD and the CPS. No ISD officer communicates with any CPS officer other than the ILO on any matter relating to an active investigation or potential prosecution. The ILO has no investigative role — they are a structural gateway, not an operational participant.

The Referral Document

The referral is a formal written document — the Intelligence Referral Notice (IRN) — written simultaneously to the NIN-SIN (classified, ISD side) and to the NIN-PR (classified, CPS side). The IRN contains a statement of the harm category that the intelligence suggests has been or is being committed; a summary of the intelligence basis sufficient for the ILO to assess viability; a statement of what independently gathered evidence would be required to support prosecution; the ISD's disclosure position and its reasons, subject to Magister review at Stage 3; an assessment of whether the intelligence source will need protection in proceedings and the mechanism proposed; and the parallel construction prohibition certificate, confirming that the referral has not been and will not be accompanied by any attempt to guide CPS investigative activity through intelligence without disclosure.

ILO Assessment

The ILO reviews the IRN and makes a written assessment: whether the harm category is within CPS jurisdiction; whether independent evidence capable of supporting prosecution exists or can be gathered; and whether proceeding would require reliance on undisclosed intelligence in a way that could not be made fair-trial-compliant. If the ILO assesses that prosecution cannot proceed without reliance on undisclosed intelligence in a way that cannot be made compliant, the referral is declined and that decision is recorded on the NIN-PR. The ISD may seek Magister review of a declined referral.

6.3 Stage 2 — The Clean Team Principle

Where the ILO assesses that prosecution may be viable, a Clean Team is constituted within the CPS. The Clean Team is the group of Investigation Officers who will conduct the independent investigation and, if proceedings result, manage the prosecution file. The defining feature of the Clean Team is what its members do not know: no Clean Team member has seen the ISD intelligence that gave rise to the referral. They have seen only what the ILO is permitted to share with them — the harm category and the nature of the suspected conduct, without the intelligence basis or source information. The principle operates as follows:

- Clean Team members are selected by the Senior Investigation Officer without ISD involvement and without knowledge of the ISD's intelligence picture
- Clean Team members are prohibited from receiving any further communication from the ILO beyond the initial harm-category identification until Stage 3 is completed
- Clean Team members are prohibited from discussing the case with anyone outside the Clean Team during the independent investigation phase
- The Clean Team conducts its investigation using only lawfully available investigative tools — overt inquiries, Magister-warranted searches, forensic analysis, witness interviews, open-source research, and its own surveillance under standard warrant
- The Clean Team's investigation is documented in full on the NIN-PR from the moment it commences, so the record can demonstrate at any later point that the investigation was conducted independently of the ISD intelligence

The CPOC conducts a mandatory Independence Audit of every Clean Team investigation prior to any charge being laid. The audit reviews whether the NIN-PR record shows an investigative trail that is internally coherent and could plausibly have been generated without intelligence guidance; whether there is any evidence of contact between the Clean Team and the ISD beyond the formal ILO channel; and whether the evidence gathered is capable of sustaining prosecution independently of any classified material. An investigation that fails the Independence Audit does not proceed.

6.4 Stage 3 — The Magister-Led Disclosure Assessment

Before charge, the CPS applies to a designated Classified Evidence Magister (CEM) — a specialist Magister with security clearance and specific training in the classified evidence architecture — for a Disclosure Assessment. The CEM is the first point at which the classified intelligence and the prosecution case are considered together in a judicial context. The CEM reviews the full ISD intelligence package from the NIN-SIN in a secure terminal environment; the complete Clean Team investigation file from the NIN-PR; the IRN, including the ISD's stated disclosure position; and the Independent Evidence Counsel's initial assessment. The CEM's task is to answer four questions:

- Question 1 (Contamination): Is there any evidence that the Clean Team investigation was guided by, or built upon, the ISD intelligence rather than conducted independently? If yes — proceedings are permanently stayed.
- Question 2 (Admissibility): Does the prosecution case, considered without any reference to the classified intelligence, contain sufficient admissible evidence to justify charge? If no — charge may not proceed.
- Question 3 (Disclosure obligation): Is any of the classified intelligence material that the ISD wishes to protect "relevant" — meaning it tends to support the defence case or undermine the

prosecution? If yes — the material must either be disclosed or the proceedings are stayed.

- Question 4 (Fair trial): Can proceedings be conducted in a way that is consistent with the accused's right to a fair hearing, given the classification constraints? If no — proceedings are stayed.

Where the answer to all four questions permits proceedings to continue, the CEM issues a Classified Evidence Protocol Order (CEPO) specifying exactly what classified material may or may not be disclosed, and in what form, during proceedings. The CEPO is binding on both the ISD and the CPS.

6.4.2 The Independent Evidence Counsel (IEC)

The Independent Evidence Counsel is a constitutionally novel role, specifically designed to address the most significant failure of the UK Special Advocate system. The IEC is a legally trained Civic Advocate who is security-cleared, has access to the full classified intelligence picture, and whose sole mandate is to assess the fairness of the disclosure position from the perspective of the accused — not to represent the accused (which would create the Special Advocate conflict of interest), but to independently advise the CEM on whether the disclosure position is consistent with fair trial. The IEC differs from the Special Advocate in three critical ways:

- The IEC takes no instructions from the accused and has no relationship with the defence — eliminating the impossible conflict of interest inherent in the Special Advocate model
- The IEC's assessment is provided to the CEM, not to the court — the IEC is an oversight mechanism within the Disclosure Assessment, not a participant in adversarial proceedings
- The IEC has a single mandate: to determine whether the classified material, if the accused knew of it, could reasonably be expected to affect their ability to mount a meaningful defence. If yes, the IEC recommends disclosure or stay.

IECs are selected from the senior Civic Advocate pool by sortition, security-cleared on appointment, and serve on individual cases rather than on a standing basis. Their opinions cannot be overridden by the CEM without written, published reasons; if the CEM disagrees with the IEC recommendation, that disagreement is part of the CEPO record and is subject to challenge by the defence. The IEC's recommendation is published in anonymised form, redacting intelligence content, on the NIN-PR as part of the CEPO record.

6.5 Stage 4 — Proceedings Management Under CEPO

What the Defence Receives

Under the CEPO, the defence receives at minimum: full disclosure of all evidence gathered by the Clean Team, without exception, including all material that assists the defence; an intelligence summary — not the source or collection method, but sufficient factual content for the accused to understand the nature of any intelligence-derived allegation and to mount a meaningful challenge to it; the existence and general nature of any classified material that has been reviewed but withheld, so the defence knows that classified material exists and has been considered even where its content is protected; and the IEC's anonymised assessment. The summary standard is the Meaningful Challenge Standard: could a properly advised and represented defendant, having read the summary, effectively challenge the allegation? If not, the summary is insufficient. There is no hidden material.

In Camera Hearings

Where it is necessary for the Magister panel presiding over proceedings to consider classified material not disclosed to the defence — for example, where the ISD is seeking to maintain a Magister-approved claim of source protection — this is done in a closed in camera session attended by the presiding Magister panel, the CPS senior advocate, the IEC, and no one else. The defence is not present and receives instead a summary of what was determined, prepared by the IEC. The record of the in camera session is preserved in full on the NIN-SIN and is available to the NSA investigative process.

Three-Magister Panel Requirement

All proceedings that involve classified evidence under a CEPO are heard by a panel of three Magisters rather than a single Magister. This is the NBI's response to the Diplock court problem: the concentration of judgment in a single judicial officer is a structural vulnerability in any system, and most acutely in a system dealing with classified evidence where the Magister must make assessments that cannot be fully challenged by the defence. A panel of three provides collective scrutiny, reduces the risk of individual error or capture, and means that the classified material is assessed by multiple independent minds.

6.6 Stage 5 — Post-Proceedings Intelligence Review

After proceedings conclude — whether by finding of responsibility, stay, acquittal, or any other outcome — a mandatory Post-Proceedings Intelligence Review (PIIR) is conducted by the CEM and a CPOC observer. The PIIR assesses whether the IREIP was followed at every stage, or whether any deviation occurred and was properly documented; whether the IEC assessment proved accurate; whether the Clean Team investigation was genuinely independent, reviewing whether any intelligence information found its way into the investigation file in ways not authorised by the CEPO; and whether the outcome of proceedings is consistent with what would have been expected without any intelligence involvement. PIIR findings are classified on the NIN-SIN, but an anonymised summary is published on the NIN-PR. A pattern of PIIR findings showing consistent IREIP failures is referred to the NSA.

Section 7: Source Protection in Proceedings

7.1 The Legal Basis for Source Protection

The NBI recognises a specific, bounded privilege protecting the identity of human intelligence sources from disclosure in legal proceedings. This privilege is not absolute — it is subject to the overriding principle that proceedings must be fair and that material genuinely relevant to the accused's ability to mount a defence cannot be withheld regardless of its sensitivity. Source protection privilege may be claimed by the ISD when a CEPO application includes intelligence derived from a human source. The claim is assessed by the CEM, not by the ISD: the ISD asserts the privilege; the CEM determines whether it is justified and whether its maintenance is consistent with fair trial.

7.2 The Graymail Defence — Prevention Architecture

Graymail — the practice by which a defendant threatens to disclose classified information in their defence as a means of forcing the prosecution to abandon the case rather than allow that disclosure — is a genuine strategic tool used by sophisticated defendants in intelligence-adjacent prosecutions. The NBI architecture addresses the graymail risk at three levels.

Level 1 — Pre-charge Disclosure Assessment

The Stage 3 CEPO process specifically identifies what classified material the accused would have a legitimate interest in disclosing and either authorises its disclosure in the proceedings or stays the case before it begins. A graymail threat can only operate where there is classified material that the prosecution needs to withhold but that genuinely assists the defence. The CEPO process resolves this before charge — if such material exists and cannot be disclosed, the case is stayed. There is no graymail opportunity because the dilemma has been resolved upstream.

Level 2 — In-Proceedings Management

Where a defendant in proceedings indicates an intention to adduce or elicit classified material in their defence — through questioning of witnesses, production of documents, or submissions — the presiding Magister panel immediately refers the matter to a CEM for emergency assessment. The CEM determines whether the proposed disclosure is genuinely relevant to the defence; is already subject to a properly assessed CEPO protection; or represents new intelligence material not previously reviewed. The defendant has an absolute right to adduce relevant evidence in their defence, and the graymail architecture does not override this — it ensures that the judicial assessment of relevance is made by an independent Magister with full access to the classified picture, rather than by the prosecuting service.

Level 3 — Absolute Bar on Case Abandonment by Executive Decision

In the NBI architecture, a prosecution may be stayed on fair-trial grounds by a Magister, but it may not be abandoned on operational security grounds by an executive decision of the ISD, the CPS, or the NSCC. The decision to stay proceedings belongs to the Magister. Where the ISD indicates that it would prefer the case to be abandoned rather than classified material disclosed, that preference is taken into account by the CEM in the CEPO assessment, but it does not determine the outcome. If the CEM determines that the material must be disclosed for fair trial, it must be disclosed — or the case is stayed by Magister order, not by executive preference. The separation of judicial from executive authority in proceedings is absolute.

7.3 Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) Handling in Proceedings

Where a prosecution rests in part on intelligence provided by a CHIS — a human source recruited and handled by the ISD — specific additional protections and obligations apply. Information from a CHIS may contribute to a prosecution through the following mechanisms: the intelligence provided by the CHIS guided the investigation to independent evidence (the Clean Team pathway, fully documented); the CHIS will testify as a witness under identity protection measures authorised by the Magister panel; or the CHIS's reports are used as intelligence-derived material subject to a CEPO, with the IEC assessing the fairness of non-attribution.

The following uses of CHIS-derived material are inadmissible under any circumstances and constitute automatic case-contamination: presenting CHIS-derived intelligence to the court as if it were independent evidence gathered by CPOs; using CHIS-derived intelligence to identify and then fabricate a legal discovery trail (parallel construction — permanently stayed); allowing the CHIS to give evidence without disclosing to the Magister that the witness is a managed ISD source; and using CHIS-derived intelligence to obtain a Magister Warrant that could not have been obtained without that intelligence, without disclosing the intelligence basis to the Magister — warrant fraud, which is a criminal matter as well as a civic breach.

Where a CHIS is willing to testify, the Magister panel may authorise specific identity protection measures: the use of a pseudonym; voice modulation; visual screening; giving evidence by live link from a separate location; or, in extreme cases, written evidence submissions without live testimony. Identity protection measures are authorised by the Magister panel after assessing the specific threat to the source's safety and the specific prejudice to the defence from each proposed measure. The accused's Civic Advocate is informed of the measures and may challenge their proportionality to the Magister panel.

Section 8: The Classified Evidence Protocol — Detailed Architecture

8.1 Overview

The Classified Evidence Protocol (CEP) is the complete framework governing the treatment of all intelligence-derived material in NBI civic proceedings. It operates alongside and through the IREIP. Where the IREIP governs the pre-charge intelligence-to-evidence pathway, the CEP governs how classified material is handled during and after proceedings. The CEP draws on and improves the US CIPA model, the UK PII regime, and the European Court of Human Rights' Article 6 jurisprudence, specifically addressing the weaknesses identified in each.

8.2 The Substitution Standard

Where a CEPO permits the substitution of an intelligence summary for the full classified original, the substitution must meet the Meaningful Challenge Standard: a defendant who reads the substituted summary must be in a position to effectively challenge any factual allegation derived from the classified intelligence. This is a higher standard than any legacy model has imposed. The IEC independently tests every substituted summary against this standard before the CEPO is issued. A summary that the IEC determines does not meet the standard is either expanded until it does; results in disclosure of the original; or results in the affected allegation being withdrawn from the proceedings.

8.3 Emergency Classification Claims

Where, during proceedings, a classification claim emerges that was not identified at the pre-charge stage — because new evidence was gathered or new classified material was identified — the proceedings are immediately paused. An emergency CEM assessment is conducted within 48 hours. The accused remains in any custody ordered by the presiding Magister during the pause. The CEM issues an emergency CEPO amendment, a new IEC assessment is produced, and the presiding Magister decides whether proceedings can fairly continue. The defence Civic Advocate is informed of the pause and its general reason within 24 hours. Repeated emergency classification claims in the same proceedings constitute a pattern that the CPOC reviews as a potential sign of bad faith by the CPS or ISD.

PART IV — COMMUNITY, CUSTODY, AND SPECIALIST OPERATIONS

Section 9: Community Policing Architecture

9.1 The Community Policing Model

Community policing in the NBI is not a programme or an initiative — it is the foundational operational mode. Every CPS deployment is oriented toward the community it serves before it is oriented toward enforcement. This is not sentiment; it reflects the empirical evidence on police effectiveness: communities that trust their police provide information, cooperate with investigations, and are more resilient against serious organised harm. Communities that distrust their police provide nothing, obstructing investigations and allowing harm to persist.

The Community Liaison Officers (CLOs) are the primary face of the CPS in most interactions with most residents, most of the time. They provide a visible, accessible, trusted civic presence that connects residents with the CPS, with civic support services, and with early intervention resources before harm occurs or escalates.

9.2 Proportionality in Community Engagement

The CPS does not police communities differentially on the basis of the demographic composition of those communities. All aggregate policing data — stop and account rates, arrest rates, use of force rates, prosecution rates — is published on the NIN public portal broken down by Community Assembly area, by time period, and by the demographic information that residents choose to provide. The CPOC monitors this data specifically for disproportionality patterns and initiates automatic reviews where disproportionality is identified.

The specific failure of racially disproportionate policing in the legacy system — documented across 25 years of official reports and still not resolved at the point of NBI Transition — is addressed through three mechanisms: the enumeration of powers, which eliminates the discretionary "soft" powers that historically operated to entrench disproportionality; the NIN-PR real-time monitoring, which makes disproportionality visible immediately rather than in retrospect; and the CPOC sortition composition, which specifically includes Community Assembly representatives who bring lived experience of community-police relations into the oversight process.

9.3 Early Intervention and Referral

The CPS is integrated with the wider NBI civic support architecture — Mental Care Facilities, restorative pathway hubs, community advocacy services — through a formal Early Intervention and Referral Protocol (EIRP). CPOs and CLOs encountering residents in circumstances better addressed by civic support than by enforcement — mental-health crisis, housing crisis, substance dependency, domestic harm where the victim needs support rather than the other party's arrest — are trained and empowered to initiate referrals through the EIRP.

The EIRP is not a mechanism for the CPS to perform the functions of other civic services. It is a structural connection between the CPS and those services, so that a resident encountered by a CPO in crisis reaches the right support rather than the wrong enforcement response. The empirical evidence on the diversion of mental-health crises from police to mental-health services — the CAHOOTS model in Oregon, the STAR programme in Denver, and the Right Care programme in Merseyside — demonstrates that appropriate referral produces better outcomes for both the resident in crisis and the broader community, at lower cost and with less long-term harm. The NBI adopts and

embeds this evidence.

Section 10: Civic Custody Architecture

10.1 The Philosophy of Civic Custody

Pre-charge custody is not punishment. It is not a preview of consequences. It is a temporary measure of last resort applied to prevent specific identified harms — flight, further harm, or destruction of evidence — while an investigation proceeds. Every element of the civic custody architecture is oriented toward this definition: conditions of custody are not harsher than necessary to achieve these specific aims; duration is not longer than necessary; and the resident in custody retains all rights that are not directly limited by the specific custody necessity.

10.2 Civic Custody Centres

Pre-charge custody is held in Civic Custody Centres (CCCs) — purpose-built facilities designed to meet specific minimum standards published on the NIN public portal and independently audited quarterly. Minimum standards include:

- Single-occupancy cells of minimum specified floor area, with access to natural light
- Access to regular meals meeting basic nutritional standards, at times aligned with normal meal patterns, and to water and toilet facilities
- Access to outdoor space for a minimum period each day
- Access to communication with a Civic Advocate, without time restriction and without monitoring
- Access to medical assessment within two hours of arrival and on request thereafter
- Access to appropriate religious or cultural facilities, and treatment with dignity throughout
- Documentation of all interactions, all requests and their outcomes, and the detained resident's stated welfare status at regular intervals

CCCs do not hold children in the same facilities as adults. Youth Civic Welfare Suites are separate facilities with enhanced welfare standards, always staffed by officers with specific youth-welfare training, and subject to enhanced CPOC oversight. No police custody facility may be designated as a place of safety for a person in mental-health crisis; the appropriate place of safety is a civilian health environment, and this is an absolute requirement.

10.3 Custody Record

The Custody Management Officer (CMO) maintains a continuous custody record for every detained resident, recorded on the NIN-PR in real time. The custody record captures arrival time and condition; every interaction; every request and its outcome; all welfare checks; all interviews; all access to Civic Advocate; all medical interventions; and the grounds for each decision about the conduct of the detention. The custody record is visible to the presiding Magister reviewing any extension application. A custody record showing that the grounds for detention have not advanced is not a record that will support an extension.

10.4 Interview Architecture

Interviews of detained residents are conducted under the following non-negotiable conditions: the detained resident is reminded of their right to a Civic Advocate before every interview, and the interview does not proceed until the Civic Advocate is present or the resident has, with the Civic Advocate present, declined to have one present for the specific interview; all interviews are video-recorded in full, audio and visual, with the recording stored on the NIN-PR; all interviews begin with a caution in plain language stating that the resident is not obliged to answer and that what they say will be recorded and may be used in proceedings; no interview may continue for more than two hours without a minimum 30-minute break, subject to the resident's right to stop at any time; and no interview tactic designed to deceive, manipulate, or coerce an answer is permitted — specifically, false-evidence ploys, sleep deprivation, environmental manipulation, or any approach designed to exploit vulnerability are prohibited.

The NBI adopts and mandates the Cognitive Interview technique — the most rigorously evidenced approach to witness and suspect interviewing in the research literature — as the standard interview method. The Cognitive Interview is specifically designed to maximise the accuracy and completeness of information provided, not to maximise confession rates. The distinction is critical: an interview architecture designed to produce confessions produces false confessions; an architecture designed to produce accurate information produces useful information.

Section 11: Specialist Operations

11.1 Civic Tactical Response Units

Civic Tactical Response Units (CTRUs) are specialist CPS teams trained and equipped for high-risk situations — incidents involving weapons, hostage-taking, or terrorist activity in progress. CTRUs are not standing armed patrols. They are deployable on specific, Magister-authorised operations or on immediate response to active threats where delay would cause casualties. CTRU deployment for any purpose other than an immediate active threat requires advance Magister authorisation specifying the operation and its justification. All CTRU operations are subject to full NIN-PR recording and automatic CPOC post-operation review.

11.2 Undercover Operations

Undercover policing — the deployment of CPOs in concealed identity to infiltrate organisations or build relationships with suspects — is the most ethically hazardous tool available to the CPS. The UK's undercover policing scandals — documented by the Undercover Policing Inquiry from 2015 and covering decades of abusive practice including sexual relationships between undercover officers and the activists they were investigating, the use of dead children's identities, and systematic surveillance of legitimate civic organisations — represent a systemic architecture failure, not merely individual misconduct. The NBI undercover architecture is built on the specific lessons of those failures:

- Undercover operations require Magister Warrant authorisation and CPOC notification before deployment — no operation may commence without both
- Undercover officers may not form intimate relationships with the people they are investigating under any circumstances — an absolute prohibition with no public interest exception
- Undercover officers may not use the identities of deceased persons
- Undercover operations targeting civic advocacy organisations, trade unions, sortition assemblies, or legitimate political or community groups are absolutely prohibited regardless of the suspected

conduct of individual members

- All undercover operations are reviewed by an independent Magister at 90-day intervals; any operation that has not produced specific actionable intelligence within 90 days is presumptively terminated unless the Magister finds specific grounds for continuation
- Post-operation, all individuals who were the subject of undercover operations are notified within five years of the operation's conclusion, the same notification obligation that applies to ISD operations on residents
- Undercover officers who engage in prohibited conduct are not indemnified by their employer — they face the same Civic Consequence pathway as any other CPO

11.3 Surveillance Operations

CPS surveillance operations — physical surveillance of individuals, vehicle tracking, use of directed surveillance, digital monitoring, communications interception, or location tracking — require Magister Warrant authorisation on the same basis as ISD surveillance, and the relevant Sortition Assembly must be provided with specific grounds, defined targets, and a defined duration. Blanket or suspicion-free surveillance is constitutionally prohibited. The CPS does not have access to ISD surveillance capabilities; any surveillance operation requiring technical capabilities beyond the CPS's own warranted toolkit requires a formal ISD request through the IREIP gateway. There is no informal capability-sharing between the ISD and the CPS, and all surveillance activity is logged and reported on conclusion.

11.4 Serious Organised Harm Investigation

Serious organised harm — drug trafficking networks, organised financial crime, people trafficking, organised violence — is investigated by dedicated Serious Organised Harm Investigation Teams (SOHITs) within the CPS, deployed under the authority of Regional Sortition Assemblies. Organised harm is defined as sustained, coordinated harm carried out by two or more individuals operating with shared intent over a period of time, using coercion, exploitation, or deception as material instruments. SOHITs operate under the same powers and the same accountability architecture as all CPS investigations, but with longer investigation timelines reflecting the complexity of organised harm and enhanced CPOC oversight reflecting the greater operational sensitivity. All measures authorised against established organised crime are specified, time-limited, and reviewable from the outset; no open-ended organised crime operation is permissible.

SOHITs are the CPS's primary interface with the ISD on matters with a national security nexus. All SOHIT referrals to the ISD and all ISD referrals to SOHITs go through the IREIP. No informal relationship between SOHIT officers and ISD officers on matters that could generate a prosecution is permitted.

Section 12: Public Order and Community Safety

12.1 Public Protest and Civic Assembly

The right of residents to assemble, protest, and express dissent — including dissent directed at the CPS or the civic architecture itself — is a foundational civic right. The CPS's role in relation to public assembly is to maintain safety, not to restrict expression. Officers attending public protests or civic assemblies must maintain a proportionate, facilitative presence; avoid tactics designed to intimidate, disperse, or undermine peaceful assembly; intervene only where specific, identifiable harm is occurring or imminently threatened; and identify themselves clearly on request from any participant. Kettling, mass arrest, and pre-emptive dispersal are prohibited, and evidence of such tactics is grounds for misconduct proceedings against the officers and leadership involved.

12.2 Prohibition of Vigilantism

No resident or group of residents may exercise enforcement authority over others within the NBI. Community safety groups, neighbourhood organisations, and civic associations may report harm, provide evidence, and participate in Sortition Assembly processes; they may not detain, punish, or coerce any person. Where vigilante activity is identified, officers are required to intervene immediately to protect the individual subject to it and to gather evidence for Assembly consideration.

12.3 Community Protection

Where communities face particular safety challenges — persistent harassment, targeted exploitation, communal conflict — the Local Sortition Assembly may authorise enhanced community protection measures. These may include increased officer presence in affected areas, conducted transparently and with community consent; deployment of civilian mediation teams to address underlying community tensions; and temporary restrictions on specific identified behaviours, time-limited and evidence-based.

Section 13: Handling Serious Harm — The Post-Judicial Framework

13.1 Replacement of the Judicial Apparatus

The NBI does not operate a court system, a prosecution service, or a judiciary in the conventional parliamentary-era sense. There are no judges, no barristers, no Crown Prosecution Service, and no sentencing guidelines. These institutions have been replaced by the Sortition Assembly system, the Magister authorisation function, and the Civic Consequence Architecture. This is not an absence of justice — it is the replacement of a professionalised, exclusionary justice system with one that is genuinely of and by the people. The CPS's role in this architecture is precisely defined: it gathers and presents evidence; it does not advise on outcomes, advocate for particular consequences, or shape the framing within which an Assembly considers a case.

13.2 The Three-Phase Response Framework

The immediate phase begins the moment officers arrive at the scene of serious harm; the priorities are securing the physical safety of all persons present, arranging immediate medical care, providing psychological first-response support where available, and preserving the physical scene to the greatest extent consistent with safety. The evidence phase, once immediate safety is established, is characterised by patience, thoroughness, and strict impartiality: all evidence is gathered without legal framing, charges, or prosecutorial intent, and the evidence package delivered to the Assembly includes a complete timeline, witness accounts recorded verbatim, physical, digital, and forensic evidence in its original form, a clear account of the current state of risk, and any relevant welfare information.

The Assembly phase is convened by the relevant Sortition Assembly on receipt of the police evidence package. The Assembly reviews all available evidence, hears from any person with relevant information, and determines whether harm occurred and its nature and extent; who bears responsibility and in what degree; what ongoing risk, if any, exists; and what actions are required in response to that risk and that responsibility. Where classified evidence forms part of a case, the proceedings are conducted under the CEPO architecture of Part III, with the three-Magister panel sitting as the determining body.

13.3 Outcomes: The Non-Punitive Principle

The NBI operates a non-punitive civic consequence system. The purpose of any response to harm is not to inflict suffering on the person who caused it — it is to protect potential future victims, repair damage to those harmed, and where possible enable the restoration of social functioning for all parties. Available outcomes from Assembly deliberation include supervised return to community with conditions; restorative obligations to repair harm caused; time-limited, reviewable restriction on movement or association; structured support through mental-health, addiction, housing, or skills services; and civic containment where ongoing risk to others is established and cannot be managed by lesser means.

Civic containment is the most serious available response, reserved for situations in which the risk to others is specific, credible, and not reducible by other means. It is never used as an expression of social disapproval, institutional anger, or deterrence. No period of containment may be imposed without formal Assembly determination on the evidence; no period is indefinite; at each review containment must be actively re-justified on current evidence and does not renew automatically; the individual has the right to present evidence and be heard at every review; a civic support representative attends every review; and the conditions must be humane, dignified, and conducive to the person's long-term reintegration. The default presumption at every review is reintegration.

Section 14: Safeguarding and Crisis Response

14.1 Children

All police interactions involving children — defined as persons under 18 years of age — are governed by an elevated duty of care. Officers must approach every interaction with a child through a welfare lens first; the child's safety, dignity, and developmental wellbeing take precedence over investigative or operational priorities. Where a child is involved in or witness to a serious harm incident, a trained child-welfare officer must be present or attend within one hour; all questioning is conducted by specially trained officers in appropriate environments with a civic support representative present; any temporary custody triggers immediate Local Sortition Assembly notification and requires Assembly authority to continue beyond two hours; and the welfare of the child is assessed independently at every stage.

14.2 Persons in Mental-Health Crisis

The CPS operates a structured, welfare-first response to all incidents where mental-health crisis is the primary presenting issue, reflecting the constitutional position that mental distress is a civic welfare matter, not a policing matter, except where immediate physical harm makes police presence necessary for safety. On receiving a call indicating mental-health crisis, the CPS coordinates with the Civic Health Service to dispatch a joint response where possible, comprising an officer trained to Mental Health First Response level and a civic mental-health practitioner where available within safe response time. The officer's role is to maintain safety, not to manage the mental-health situation itself; the practitioner leads on therapeutic engagement; and the moment police presence is no longer required for safety, withdrawal is the expected course of action.

Officers attending any incident with a mental-health dimension are required to approach calmly, without displays of force or authority that may heighten distress; identify themselves clearly and explain their purpose; use plain, non-clinical language; allow the individual to set the pace of engagement where safety permits; avoid physical contact unless immediately necessary for safety; and coordinate handover to civic health professionals at the earliest safe opportunity. Physical restraint of a person in mental-health crisis is a last resort only and must be immediately accompanied by medical assessment. No mental-health crisis constitutes grounds for standard temporary custody — welfare placement is the appropriate intervention.

14.3 Other Vulnerable Persons

Additional provisions apply to persons whose vulnerability affects their capacity to engage with police processes on equal terms, including persons with cognitive disabilities, persons in situations of domestic or sexual exploitation, persons experiencing homelessness, and persons in severe economic distress. The CPS's obligation is to ensure that vulnerability is never exploited — operationally, institutionally, or individually — in its interactions with the public.

PART V — THE SERVICE: PEOPLE, PAY, AND ORGANISATION

Section 15: Recruitment, Standards, and Selection

15.1 Recruitment Principles

The CPS recruits on the basis of civic purpose. It seeks people who are genuinely oriented toward public safety, who understand and accept the bounded nature of police authority, and who have the physical, psychological, and civic competence to serve the mandate effectively. It does not seek those attracted primarily to authority, status, or enforcement as ends in themselves. Recruitment is open to all residents who meet the specified standards; free from discrimination on the basis of any protected characteristic; designed to attract a service that reflects the diversity of the communities it serves; and subject to public transparency, with all recruitment criteria, processes, and outcomes publicly accessible.

15.2 Physical Fitness Standards

Physical fitness standards apply equally to all candidates and serving officers and are calibrated to reflect the genuine operational demands of policing — not to create an arbitrary physical elite, but to ensure that every officer can perform the full range of their duties safely and competently. These standards are achievable through consistent, moderate physical training by a healthy adult. All serving officers must pass the full fitness assessment annually. Failure results in mandatory entry into a supported fitness programme with independent oversight and reassessment within 90 days; sustained failure results in redeployment to a non-operational review role with a further six-month window to regain operational fitness; and permanent incapacity is referred to the Local Sortition Assembly for transition to an appropriate civic or support role. Officers with disabilities or health conditions affecting particular components of the assessment are assessed against a bespoke functional-equivalence framework, developed in consultation with the officer, an independent occupational health practitioner, and the relevant Assembly.

15.3 Psychological and Mental Fitness Standards

All candidates complete a multi-stage psychological assessment prior to appointment, conducted by independent civic psychologists not employed by or professionally affiliated with the CPS, with findings reviewed by a Local Sortition Assembly panel. The following are automatic disqualifying indicators, confirmed by independent assessment: diagnosable narcissistic, antisocial, or sadistic personality traits within clinical definitions; a history of interpersonal violence outside defined self-defence, including domestic abuse and institutional bullying; demonstrated enjoyment of, or attraction to, coercive authority as an end in itself; persistent inability to identify with or adequately acknowledge the experience of victims; deceptive patterns or material inconsistencies across the assessment process; and an expressed belief that the service should have authority beyond its civic mandate. These indicators are not punishments; they reflect an honest assessment of compatibility with the civic mandate. A person presenting them may thrive in many other roles, but the exercise of police authority over others is not among them.

In addition to psychometric assessment, all candidates attend a Civic Integrity Interview conducted by a panel that includes at least two residents drawn by sortition from the relevant community. The interview assesses the candidate's understanding of and genuine commitment to the DD&SA principles, their comprehension of the limits of police authority, and their orientation toward accountability and transparency. The sortition-drawn residents have full voting rights on the

appointment panel.

15.4 Civic Competence Standards

Civic competence is the third pillar of entry assessment. Officers must demonstrate, at entry and through their service, sufficient understanding of the civic architecture to act within it intelligently and in good faith: a working knowledge of the DD&SA constitutional framework and the position of policing within it; comprehension of the Sortition Assembly system and the officer's relationship to it; understanding of the Civic Rule system and its replacement of parliamentary-era law; knowledge of the non-punitive consequence architecture and the officer's role within it; and familiarity with the civic rights of all persons encountered in the course of duty. Civic competence is assessed at entry through written and scenario-based examination and reassessed annually through continuous professional development review. Significant gaps, particularly in relation to constitutional principles, constitute a professional development priority and, if persistent, a fitness-for-duty concern.

Section 16: Training Programme and Continuous Development

16.1 Initial Training Programme

All newly appointed officers complete a 24-week initial training programme before operational deployment, in addition to the Civic Policing Ethics Programme. The programme combines residential academic study, physical conditioning, practical scenario training, and supervised community placement, and is delivered at Regional Civic Safety Training Centres — independent institutions accountable to Regional Sortition Assemblies. The curriculum covers constitutional and civic architecture (the DD&SA framework, the Sortition Assembly system, the Civic Rule system, constitutional rights, and the non-punitive consequence architecture); communication and community engagement; physical skills and operational safety, with restraint techniques limited to approved methods and an emphasis on minimal force; impartial evidence gathering, including witness engagement without leading or coercion, digital evidence and chain of custody, and documentation standards; de-escalation and conflict resolution across domestic, communal, organised, and mental-health-crisis contexts; ethics, accountability, and integrity, integrated throughout all 24 weeks; and a supervised community placement under CSL supervision, assessed by a placement mentor and a sortition panel.

16.2 Specialist Training

Officers seeking qualification as Specialist Practitioners complete additional programmes on top of initial training, assessed and certificated independently. Available specialisms include Mental Health First Response (a 16-week programme in partnership with Civic Health Services); Child Safeguarding (a 20-week specialist programme with assessed placement); Firearms (a 30-week programme with continuous reassessment, certification lapsing annually); Cybercrime Investigation (a 20-week programme with technical and legal components); Serious Crime Investigation (a 20-week programme in evidence, forensics, and covert capability); and Conducted Energy Device certification (an eight-week programme with quarterly reassessment).

16.3 Continuous Professional Development

All serving officers complete a minimum of 30 hours of formal continuous professional development per year, including an annual constitutional and civic architecture update mandatory for all officers, annual fitness requalification, annual first-aid requalification, annual de-escalation refresher, and specialist requalification as required by specialism. CPD records are publicly accessible: an officer's current certifications and CPD history are held on the Civic Transparency Register and available to any resident on request.

Section 17: Economic Structure, Pay, and Conditions

17.1 Absolute Incentive Prohibition

The CPS may derive no financial benefit from the exercise of its functions. No individual officer, no unit, and no institutional body within the service may receive financial reward, bonus, target-linked benefit, or any other material advantage connected to the number of arrests, detentions, or stops conducted; the number or value of assets forfeited; the outcomes of Sortition Assembly processes; or performance against enforcement-volume metrics of any kind. This prohibition is absolute and admits no operational exception. The funding of the service is a flat civic allocation, determined by Sortition Assemblies on the basis of operational need and public safety evidence; it is not performance-linked and creates no financial incentive for enforcement.

17.2 Asset Forfeiture and Distribution

Assets causally linked to serious harm — including financial assets, property, and instruments of exploitation — may be subject to civic forfeiture. Forfeiture is not a punitive measure but a protective one, designed to remove the material infrastructure of ongoing harm. Assets may only be forfeited where a direct causal link to specific harm has been established by a Sortition Assembly on the evidence; forfeiture may not be applied as punishment or on the basis of suspicion; and assets are never directed to the CPS — no police unit, officer, or institutional body may benefit financially from any forfeiture. Forfeited assets are allocated in priority order: first, direct restoration of harm to identified victims; second, community services within the area most affected by the harm; and third, the Resident Commons, the civic fund maintained for collective public benefit.

17.3 Pay, Conditions, and Officer Welfare

Officers are paid on a transparent, publicly accessible civic pay scale, determined by Sortition Assemblies on the basis of role complexity, operational risk, and civic proportionality. Pay is published in full by grade and role, reviewed annually, adjusted for cost of living within each geographic area, and not subject to performance-related variation. Conditions of service include a maximum operational shift length of ten hours with at least twelve hours' mandatory rest between shifts; mandatory annual leave appropriate to the demands of the role; full access to occupational health services; protection from arbitrary redeployment, enforced overtime, or unsafe working conditions; and the right to raise concerns about working conditions without professional repercussion. Officers who complete service in good standing receive civic pension provision determined by the relevant Assembly; officers removed for serious misconduct forfeit pension entitlement accrued after the date of the breach, subject to Assembly determination.

17.4 Officer Welfare and Psychological Support

The CPS has a duty of care to its officers that is institutionally enforceable, not merely aspirational. Mandatory welfare provisions for all serving officers include access to independent civilian psychological support at any time without requirement for managerial approval; a mandatory post-incident debrief following any engagement with serious harm, death, or traumatic circumstances, treated as a welfare requirement and not a disciplinary process; quarterly wellbeing check-ins with an independent civic health practitioner; and an annual formal psychological review conducted by a practitioner independent of the service. Engagement with psychological support is not recorded in any officer's professional assessment and cannot be used against them in any misconduct, performance, or promotion process; any officer, supervisor, or institutional process that stigmatises engagement with support is itself in breach of the civic mandate. An officer whose psychological state has deteriorated to a point where their civic function is compromised may be placed on reviewed-duty status as a welfare measure, not a punitive one, retaining full pay, all civic rights, and access to support throughout.

Section 18: Structure and Organisation

18.1 Local Units

Local units are the foundation of the CPS. Each unit serves a defined geographic community and is directly accountable to the Local Sortition Assembly of that area. Local units are responsible for prevention, community engagement, immediate response, and evidence gathering within their area, and their size is determined by community need as assessed by the Assembly.

18.2 Regional Coordination Capability

Regional coordination capabilities are standing resources deployable across multiple local areas where a situation exceeds local capacity, including serious crime investigation, organised crime response, public order capacity, and specialist intervention. Regional deployment requires a mandate from the relevant Regional Sortition Assembly.

18.3 National Specialist Functions

A small number of genuinely national functions exist where local or regional structures cannot meet the need: counter-terrorism intelligence liaison (non-operational, advisory only, conducted through the IREIP gateway); cybercrime investigation capability; the Civic Forensic Service; and professional development and training coordination. All national functions are accountable to a National Sortition Assembly convened for the purpose of policing oversight. They do not report to any government ministry, central executive, or political body. Counter-terrorism within the NBI is primarily an intelligence and prevention function: the CPS responds to active terrorist incidents within the same framework as all serious harm incidents, gathers and presents evidence, and coordinates with civic intelligence functions within defined constitutional parameters. The CPS does not have a domestic intelligence mandate, does not conduct surveillance of political, ideological, or religious communities, and does not pre-emptively detain individuals on the basis of suspected future action.

PART VI — ACCOUNTABILITY, FAILURE MODES, AND INTEGRATION

Section 19: Accountability Architecture — Complete Specification

19.1 Layered Accountability

The CPS accountability architecture operates at several layers simultaneously — the Sortition Assembly mandate, the Magister authorisation function, the CPOC pattern oversight, the individual complaint process, and the public NIN-PR record — creating a system in which failure to catch misconduct at one layer is caught at another, and in which accountability is not dependent on any single body operating perfectly.

19.2 Misconduct: Principles and Categories

Police misconduct is a civic matter of the highest seriousness. The service is entrusted with borrowed authority over the safety and liberty of residents; any abuse of that authority — whether deliberate, reckless, or negligent — is a breach not merely of professional standards but of the constitutional compact. The following conduct categories constitute formal misconduct: use of force outside the defined principles; conduct on the basis of protected characteristics; falsification, omission, or misrepresentation in evidence gathering; interference with Sortition Assembly proceedings; unauthorised extension of police authority beyond defined mandate; abuse of custody, including degrading treatment, unlawful detention, or denial of welfare; failure to intervene when witnessing the misconduct of another officer; deliberate obstruction of whistleblower protection; and any action designed to accumulate institutional power or resist accountability.

19.3 Individual Complaint and Determination

Any person — resident, officer, or civic institution — may initiate a misconduct complaint, submitted to the relevant Local Sortition Assembly or through the NIN public portal, not to the CPS itself. Complaints are processed on a defined timetable: within 48 hours the CPOC acknowledges receipt and automatically pulls the relevant NIN-PR records; within 14 days it produces an Initial Assessment of whether there is a case to answer; and within 90 days it produces a findings report. The CPOC does not itself determine complaints — where a case to answer is established it refers the matter to an Independent Sortition Review Assembly, which has full access to all investigative evidence, may call any witness, may order further investigation, and whose determination is final. There is no appeal to any policing institution; appeals may be made only on the grounds of process failure and are heard by a fresh Assembly panel. The CPS does not investigate complaints about its own officers, and there is no internal-affairs function: this is the structural lesson of every legacy model that has tried to establish genuinely independent investigation within the police body.

19.4 Misconduct Consequences and the Civic Memory Register

The range of consequences available to an Independent Sortition Review Assembly includes a formal public reprimand; restitution to a person harmed by the misconduct; mandatory retraining with reassessment; operational restriction; reduction in grade or responsibility; and removal from the service, permanent and without right of return to any policing function. In cases of serious misconduct involving harm to a member of the public, the Assembly also determines whether that harm should be addressed through the civic consequence system, with the officer entering the same framework as any other person who has caused harm to another. All misconduct findings are recorded permanently on the Civic Memory Register — a publicly accessible record whose entries cannot be erased, though they may be contextualised. The Register records the full identity of the officer concerned, the nature of the breach, the complete evidentiary basis, the outcome determined, and any contextualisation submitted, serving the constitutional principle that residents are entitled to know the conduct history of those entrusted with police authority over their communities.

19.5 Whistleblower Protection and False Accusations

Officers who report the misconduct of a colleague or the institutional failings of the service receive immediate and unconditional protection: anonymity where requested and operationally viable through the Independent Sortition Review Assembly; protection from retaliation of any kind, including informal professional marginalisation; and immediate review of any adverse action taken following a protected disclosure. An officer who fails to report witnessed misconduct may themselves be found in breach of their civic duty. Deliberate false accusations of misconduct — made with knowledge of their falsity and intent to harm an officer — are a civic matter subject to Assembly consideration and may attract restorative obligations, civic sanctions, and public correction; false-accusation processes do not reduce the seriousness with which genuine complaints are treated and do not create a deterrent to good-faith complaint.

19.6 Pattern Monitoring and Systemic Review

Individual complaint resolution addresses individual incidents. Systemic problems — the kind that produced 25 years of Macpherson-documented disproportionality, 40 years of undercover scandal, and decades of disclosure failures — are not visible in individual complaints; they are visible only in patterns. The CPOC's pattern monitoring function is designed for this: monthly publication of aggregate policing data by area, demographic, harm type, and outcome; quarterly pattern review identifying any aggregate pattern inconsistent with the ethics principles or the minimum standards of the civic compact; an automatic systemic-review trigger where any statistically significant disproportionality in any aggregate measure is identified, independent of any complaint; and an annual State of Civic Policing Report published on the NIN public portal.

Section 20: Anti-Corruption and Anti-Drift Mechanisms

20.1 No Institutional Permanence

The CPS has no constitutional right to continue in its current form. Police structures may be periodically assessed, restructured, and where necessary dissolved. This is not a contingency for failure — it is a routine constitutional mechanism for preventing the drift that all institutions eventually experience toward self-preservation and authority accumulation. Each local unit undergoes a structured Assembly review on a five-year cycle, examining whether the unit's mandate remains appropriate, whether its powers are being used within their limits, whether its culture is aligned with the civic principles of the Framework, and whether its form continues to serve the community effectively. The Assembly may restructure, remandate, or dissolve the unit following review. Where policing fails systemically, the Assembly system may suspend unit leadership pending investigation, require an independent review of the entire unit's operations, dissolve and reconstruct the unit under a fresh mandate and new personnel, or transfer specific functions to other civic bodies.

20.2 Authority Compression and Drift Detection

The long-term trajectory of police authority within the NBI is one of gradual compression, not expansion. As civic institutions mature, as community-based prevention becomes embedded, and as the Sortition Assembly system becomes fully operational, the need for active police intervention should diminish; police powers must reduce over time, not expand. Any pattern in which police powers are incrementally expanding — through precedent, emergency overuse, or institutional lobbying — is treated as institutional drift and triggers immediate Assembly review. Sortition Assemblies actively monitor the service for drift indicators: power accumulation; emergency overuse as a workaround to normal accountability; complexity growth that reduces external comprehensibility and resident oversight; cultural enclosure that prioritises institutional loyalty over civic accountability; and metric gaming that generates favourable indicators without improving genuine civic safety. The service does not self-assess for drift — that function belongs to residents.

20.3 Emergency Powers

Police do not gain automatic powers in emergencies. The instinct of all institutions under pressure is to accumulate authority, and the design of this Framework exists precisely to frustrate that instinct: emergencies are the moments when the limits on police authority are most important to maintain, because they are the moments when violations of those limits are most easily rationalised. All emergency authority must be formally granted by a Sortition Assembly, convened via emergency procedure within four hours where necessary; specific to the emergency, defined by the nature and scope of the threat rather than general operational desire; time-limited, lapsing automatically at an Assembly-set expiry; and reviewed after use. Where the urgency of a situation makes full Assembly convening impractical within a safe response timeframe, an emergency panel of five residents drawn by lot from the current Assembly pool may grant provisional emergency authority, which must be ratified by a full Assembly within 24 hours or it expires.

Section 21: Failure Mode Analysis — Adversarial Stress-Testing

Failure Mode 1: Institutional Culture Drift

Description: the CPS, despite its constitutional architecture, develops an institutional culture that values solidarity over accountability, systematically under-records problematic conduct, and treats the ethics architecture as external constraint rather than internal commitment. Likelihood: high without continuous structural pressure; every police service in the legacy system experienced culture drift of this kind. Countermeasures: the NIN-PR real-time recording eliminates the most egregious recording failures, since the gap is visible; culture drift then manifests in the quality and honesty of recording rather than its existence, and the CPOC pattern monitoring is designed to detect the signatures of dishonest recording — records that are implausibly uniform, that show consistently minimal grounds for use of force, or that lack the detail of genuine contemporaneous accounts. The sortition-based CPOC composition includes people without police-culture socialisation who can see these signatures, and the depth of the ethics curriculum is designed to build a genuinely different officer culture rather than an obeyed rule set.

Failure Mode 2: Circumvention of the IREIP Through Informal Channels

Description: ISD officers and CPS Investigation Officers develop personal relationships — through joint training, shared operational experiences, or informal social networks — that allow intelligence to flow outside the formal IREIP gateway, producing soft parallel construction. Likelihood: high; this is the historically observed pattern in every system with a formal separation between intelligence and law enforcement, and the CSIS/RCMP model was repeatedly circumvented in exactly this way. Countermeasures: the Clean Team Independence Audit specifically looks for investigative trails inconsistent with a genuinely independent investigation; the NIN-PR's timestamped record of every investigative action allows reconstruction of the investigative narrative, so an investigation that took turns only explicable in light of intelligence the Clean Team was not supposed to have is detectable; joint training between ISD and CPS operational personnel is prohibited, with the ILO as the sole interface; and any identified circumvention permanently stays the affected proceedings and activates the highest-tier consequence pathway for all officers involved.

Failure Mode 3: Magister Warrant System Gaming

Description: CPOs systematically present warrant applications in ways that are technically sufficient but misleading — emphasising supportive intelligence while omitting context that would weaken the application, or applying to Magisters known to be less rigorous. Likelihood: moderate; this has been documented in every warrant system studied over time, with FISA applications showing systematic omission of exculpatory material that the Woods Procedures were designed to address and largely failed to. Countermeasures: warrant applications are write-once NIN-PR records at the point of submission and cannot be retrospectively amended to remove the evidence of omission; the CEM's access to the full intelligence picture at Stage 3 means any warrant application that misrepresented the intelligence picture is visible in the comparison between the application's stated basis and the actual NIN-SIN record; refused warrants from any Magister are recorded, blocking the practice of shopping a refused application to a different Magister; and the CPOC reviews warrant application patterns for quality and honesty, not merely outcomes.

Failure Mode 4: The Fair Trial Pressure Test — A Well-Resourced Defendant

Description: a sophisticated defendant, represented by the most capable legal team available, systematically attacks the architecture through legal challenges designed either to expose classified intelligence or to force abandonment of the case. This is not wrongdoing; it is the legitimate operation of adversarial justice, and the question is whether the architecture can withstand it. Assessment: the architecture is designed specifically to withstand this pressure. The three-Magister panel eliminates the single-point vulnerability of a solo judicial officer; the IEC's role anticipates the arguments a sophisticated defence will make about the unfairness of the disclosure position, because the IEC has made those arguments first from a position of full intelligence access; the graymail architecture prevents the threat of disclosure being used as a stay-forcing mechanism; and the Meaningful Challenge Standard means a sophisticated challenge to the adequacy of disclosure will succeed only if the summary genuinely is inadequate — in which case the challenge should succeed. The honest answer is that some well-resourced defendants will succeed in staying proceedings through IREIP challenges, and this is appropriate: a stay granted because the IREIP could not produce a fair-trial-compliant disclosure is the system working correctly, not failing.

Failure Mode 5: The Political Pressure Test — Elite Defendants

Description: an investigation or prosecution involving powerful individuals is subject to institutional pressure to be abandoned, conducted less rigorously, or structured to protect the defendant from the full application of the law. Likelihood: very high; the differential application of criminal law to wealthy and powerful defendants is the most extensively documented failure of every justice system in the historical record. Countermeasures: the NIN-PR public record is the primary countermeasure — it is extremely difficult to quietly drop an investigation publicly recorded from the outset, and any decision not to proceed that is visible on the NIN-PR requires a written, NIN-PR-published explanation. Anonymous complaint to the CPOC about investigation abandonment is available to any resident, including investigators who believe they are being pressured; the CPOC has authority to investigate decision-making about investigation and prosecution, not just conduct during investigation; and the NSA investigative process is available for any pattern suggesting systematic differential application. These countermeasures do not eliminate elite advantage, but they make its exercise visible and documented in a way that creates risk for those who exercise it.

Failure Mode 6: The False Negative — Missing Genuine Threats

Description: the IREIP's requirements are so demanding that genuine threats are not prosecuted because the intelligence-to-evidence pathway is too difficult to navigate, so that serious organised harm, terrorism, and hostile state activity goes unpunished. Assessment: this is the most legitimate criticism of a rigorous intelligence-to-evidence architecture, and it deserves a direct answer. Yes, some cases that could be prosecuted if the IREIP were less rigorous will not be prosecuted under this architecture. This is not a flaw — it is a design choice. The alternative, allowing convictions on the basis of intelligence the defendant cannot challenge and that may be wrong, produces a system that incarcerates innocent people with no reliable mechanism for discovering the error. The Judith Ward case, the Guildford Four, the Birmingham Six, and the Stefan Kiszko case were all proceedings in which intelligence or police conviction that the defendant was guilty contributed to outcomes the defendant could not effectively challenge. The NBI architecture accepts some false negatives as the cost of avoiding false positives and structural unfairness. What it does not accept is that this trade-off is fixed: the quality of independent evidence gathering, the effectiveness of Clean Team investigations, and the IREIP's efficiency all improve over time, reducing the false-negative rate without compromising the constitutional standards.

Section 22: Integration with the DD&SA Constitutional Architecture

22.1 Supersession and Consolidation

This Second Edition consolidates and retires the separate Policing Framework for the New British Isles (DDSA-POL-NBI-001). All substantive provisions of that instrument — the borrowed-authority principle, the three-tier civic safety mandate, the Sortition Assembly oversight structure, the temporary custody framework, the arming framework, the post-judicial response and civic containment rules, officer welfare and pay, recruitment and psychological screening, the training curriculum, organised crime and public-order provisions, the five-year unit-renewal cycle, and the anti-drift mechanisms — are absorbed in full above and reconciled with the First Edition's enumerated-powers structure and intelligence-to-evidence architecture. Two terminological reconciliations have been made for coherence: the warranted officer is the Civic Policing Officer (CPO) throughout, and the non-warranted community role is the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) throughout, eliminating the previous "CSO" collision. Detention provisions are harmonised to the more protective model — a 12-hour initial period with Magister-authorized extension inside Assembly-set limits and 12-hour review intervals.

22.2 The Two Governance Layers in Summary

The democratic layer and the operational-judicial layer are distinct and complementary. Sortition Assemblies set mandates, ratify force above the minimum threshold, determine outcomes in harm cases, hear misconduct through Independent Sortition Review Assemblies, and may dissolve units. Magisters authorise specific coercive acts — warrants, detention extensions, surveillance and undercover authorisations, disclosure rulings — and constitute the three-Magister panels for classified proceedings. The CPOC provides continuous, real-time, pattern-level oversight of the entire operational record. Assemblies own the service; Magisters authorise specific coercive acts; the CPOC watches the record. Each individual exercise of significant power is independently authorised, and the whole is visible to residents.

22.3 The Officer Oath of Civic Service

On completion of initial training and before operational deployment, every officer takes an oath of civic service before a panel of residents drawn by sortition from their community, affirming that their authority is borrowed and not owned, that they will use the minimum force necessary, that they will serve the community rather than enforce upon it, that they will record their actions honestly, and that they accept the accountability of the civic compact as a condition of service.

22.4 Transparency and Amendment

All proceedings of policing oversight assemblies are public by default; all evidence packages are publicly accessible; all misconduct findings and their outcomes are permanently recorded on the Civic Memory Register; all stop records are logged on the Civic Transparency Register; and the service's internal procedures, training curricula, pay scales, and institutional frameworks — including this Framework — are publicly published and permanently accessible. The only exceptions to public transparency are those justified by specific, immediate safety concerns or by the classified-evidence architecture of Part III, all of which are formally authorised and, where applicable, time-limited. This Framework may be amended by the relevant Sortition Assemblies on the presentation of evidence that amendment is required; proposed amendments must be published publicly for a minimum of 30 days before adoption, with a formal opportunity for community response. No amendment may increase police powers without a supermajority determination of the relevant Assembly; amendments that reduce police powers may be adopted by simple majority.

22.5 The Authorial Statement

This Framework was written in the knowledge that it will be read by those who wish to find its weaknesses — by the legally sophisticated, by the politically powerful, by those who believe that security demands sacrificing the rights of the many for the safety of the few, and by those who believe that any accountability is an obstacle to effective policing. It was written to withstand every one of those readings.

The historical record is clear: security services and police forces without robust constitutional constraints do not become more effective as constraints are removed. They become less trustworthy, less trusted, less capable of the community cooperation that is the foundation of actual security, and more dangerous to the residents they nominally serve. The NBI architecture does not make that trade. It holds, without apology and without exception, that the safety of the nation is inseparable from the rights of its residents — and that any security apparatus that protects the former by destroying the latter has accomplished nothing worth protecting.

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