

DIRECT DEMOCRACY & SORTITION ASSEMBLIES

A Civic Architecture for the British Isles

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International Civic Compact

A constitutional framework for coordination between DD&SA; nations — sovereignty amplified by the coherence of those who share it

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“We inherit the lessons of the past, not its chains.”

— **DD&SA Founding Principle**

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A living document — subject to civic deliberation and democratic revision.

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PREAMBLE

We, the sortition assemblies of the signatory nations, constituted by residents selected by lot from the peoples of our respective territories, and acting under the mandates of our national DD&SA constitutional frameworks, hereby establish this International Civic Compact.

We proceed from the following recognitions:

I. That the legitimacy of all governance — including international governance — must originate from the people, and cannot be derived from corporations, unelected bodies, self-selected elites, or any organisation that has not received a democratic mandate from the residents it purports to govern.

II. That the nation remains the primary unit of democratic self-governance, and that no international framework is legitimate if it diminishes the sovereign authority of residents over their own affairs.

III. That certain challenges — climate change, pandemic preparedness, artificial intelligence governance, trade coordination, and collective security — are inherently cross-border in character, and that nations acting in isolation cannot address them with the effectiveness that their severity demands.

IV. That the international institutions which presently exist were not designed by residents and do not draw their authority from residents; that many have drifted toward capture by corporate interests, permanent bureaucracies, and self-perpetuating expert classes; and that their reform, replacement, or supplementation by legitimately constituted bodies is therefore both necessary and urgent.

V. That cooperation between DD&SA nations must itself be governed by the same principles that govern those nations domestically: sovereignty of residents, dispersion of power, rotation of authority, adversarial epistemics, structural accountability, and the protection of human dignity as a constitutional requirement.

VI. That this Compact does not create a supranational government. It creates a structured, rule-bound, deliberative framework through which sovereign DD&SA nations coordinate on specified domains, in accordance with mandates issued by their respective sortition assemblies, and subject at all times to the right of any nation to withdraw.

This Compact is therefore not a transfer of sovereignty. It is a protocol for its coordinated exercise.

PART I — FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES

Chapter 1: The Basis of International Civic Authority

Article 1 — The Source of Authority

1. All authority exercised under this Compact derives exclusively from the residents of the signatory nations, acting through their constitutionally established sortition assemblies. No person, institution, corporation, or intergovernmental body possesses authority under this Compact that has not been explicitly delegated to it by those assemblies.

2. The Compact does not create standing authority in any secretariat, court, or coordinating body that is not subject to continuous oversight by sortition assemblies. All institutional authority under this Compact is delegated, temporary, and revocable.

3. No commercial entity, private foundation, non-governmental organisation, or body not constituted by direct democratic mandate may hold decision-making authority, observer status with voting rights,

or advisory status that is not subject to adversarial challenge under the epistemic provisions of this Compact.

Article 2 — The Principle of Subsidiarity

1. This Compact operates strictly on the principle of subsidiarity. Every matter that can be decided at the level of the individual resident, community, or nation shall be decided there. International coordination is authorised only where the cross-border character of a matter makes national-level action structurally insufficient.
2. The burden of justification rests entirely with those who propose international coordination, not with those who prefer national action. Expansion of Compact authority requires affirmative mandate from all signatory assemblies; contraction requires only the withdrawal of mandate by the affected nation.
3. The domains of coordination are enumerated in Part VI of this Compact. No authority outside those enumerated domains may be exercised under this Compact. Any claimed expansion of authority beyond enumerated domains is void and shall be referred to the International Civic Court for adjudication.

Article 3 — Non-Supremacy of International Instruments

1. This Compact does not supersede the constitutional law of any signatory nation. In all conflicts between the requirements of this Compact and the constitutional provisions of a signatory nation's DD&SA framework, the national constitutional provision prevails.
2. This Compact is not a higher law. It is a coordination agreement between constitutional equals. Its obligations are honoured because the sortition assemblies of member nations have chosen to honour them, and for no other reason.
3. Decisions made under this Compact become binding on a signatory nation only upon ratification by that nation's National Sortition Assembly. No executive, secretariat, or international court may impose obligations on a signatory nation without such ratification.

Article 4 — The Prohibition on Elite Capture

1. This Compact explicitly prohibits the structures through which international institutions have historically been captured by narrow interests. The following forms of capture are prohibited and shall be sanctionable under Article 52:
 - (a) Corporate participation in deliberative or decision-making processes of any Compact institution, except as regulated witnesses under adversarial conditions governed by Article 38.
 - (b) Permanent staff or secretariat personnel accumulating institutional authority beyond the limits of their defined operational role, or serving for periods that enable the formation of entrenched bureaucratic interests.
 - (c) The formation of any class of professional international representatives who hold their positions for extended periods, acquire specialised influence, and cease to be accountable to the residents whose mandate they were delegated.
 - (d) The entrenchment of any single epistemic framework, economic model, or governance paradigm as the default analytical basis of Compact institutions, without mandatory challenge by independent epistemic bodies.

2. The Civic Integrity Inspectorate, established under Article 28, shall maintain a public register of capture risk indicators across all Compact institutions, updated not less than quarterly. Any resident of any signatory nation may submit capture risk observations to this register.

Article 5 — Human Dignity as a Structural Constraint

1. Every decision made under this Compact, at every level of every institution, is subject to the overriding constraint that it must not diminish the structural conditions required for human dignity in any signatory nation.

2. The Maslow Compact Constraint applies to all international coordination: no economic, environmental, or security measure coordinated under this Compact may be implemented if credible evidence exists that it would compromise the capacity of any signatory nation to meet the subsistence, security, or basic welfare needs of its residents.

3. The Civic Dignity Review Panel, constituted under Article 30, shall assess all proposed binding measures against this constraint before ratification by national assemblies. Its assessment shall be published and may not be withheld from any resident.

Article 6 — Transparency as a Constitutional Requirement

1. All deliberations, decisions, votes, and institutional communications under this Compact are public by default. Exceptions exist only for national security matters governed by Article 63, and only for the minimum duration required.

2. No secret treaty, protocol, annexe, or memorandum may be concluded under this Compact. Any instrument of coordination that is not published in full, in plain language accessible to ordinary residents, is void.

3. Each signatory nation's participation in Compact deliberations — including voting records, proposed amendments, and stated objections — shall be published in real time and archived in perpetuity in the Civic Memory Archive established under Article 32.

Article 7 — The Principle of Temporal Authority

1. No individual or body shall hold a position of authority under this Compact for a period exceeding the term permitted by its constituting provision. Rotation is mandatory. Exemptions to rotation require affirmative vote by all signatory assemblies and may not exceed one additional term.

2. Those who exercise authority under this Compact derive no special status, immunity from civic accountability, or ongoing privileges from having done so. Upon conclusion of their service, delegates, inspectors, and commissioners return to the status of ordinary residents.

3. No professional class of international civic servant may form under this Compact. The Secretariat General, constituted under Article 27, shall employ the minimum operational staff required for institutional function, and no post shall be designated permanent.

Article 8 — The Right of Unilateral Withdrawal

1. Any signatory nation retains the unconditional right to withdraw from this Compact at any time, for any reason, without penalty, by resolution of its National Sortition Assembly.

2. Withdrawal takes effect twelve months after formal notification to the Coordinating Secretariat, during which period the withdrawing nation retains all rights and obligations of membership, and may rescind its withdrawal by assembly resolution.

3. No provision of this Compact, no decision of the International Civic Court, and no resolution of the Civic Assembly of Nations may prevent, penalise, or delay the exercise of the right of withdrawal. Any such attempt is void.

PART II — MEMBERSHIP

Chapter 2: Eligibility, Admission, and Status

Article 9 — Eligibility for Membership

1. Membership of this Compact is open to any nation that has fully adopted a DD&SA constitutional framework meeting the following minimum requirements:

- (a) A primary legislative chamber constituted entirely by sortition, with no elected professional politicians holding decision-making authority at the national level.
- (b) Mandatory rotation of all sortition positions, with no individual serving more than one complete term in any five-year period.
- (c) A constitutional prohibition on any corporation, private foundation, or non-governmental body holding voting or binding advisory authority in national governance.
- (d) An operational Independent Epistemic Secretariat or functional equivalent providing adversarial information architecture to the national sortition assembly.
- (e) A constitutional Vulnerability Register or equivalent structural accountability instrument, maintained publicly and reviewed by resident panels.
- (f) An unconditional right of any resident to stand for sortition selection, subject only to the universal eligibility criteria established in the national DD&SA constitution.

2. Compliance with eligibility criteria shall be assessed by the Civic Admission Panel constituted under Article 11, not by existing member governments, and not by any body in which existing member nations hold decisive voting power.

Article 10 — Observer Status

1. Nations in active transition toward a DD&SA constitutional framework, having publicly committed to the model and commenced substantive structural reform, may apply for Observer Status with the following rights:

- (a) Attendance at all non-restricted deliberations of the Civic Assembly of Nations.
- (b) The right to make written submissions to any Compact institution.
- (c) Access to the Civic Memory Archive and all epistemic resources of the Compact.
- (d) Participation in the International Civic Learning Programme established under Article 46.

2. Observer Status carries no voting rights, binding obligations, or access to security domains. It may be withdrawn by resolution of the Civic Assembly of Nations if the applicant nation demonstrably ceases its transition toward DD&SA.

3. Observer Status may be held for a maximum period of fifteen years, reflecting the DD&SA transition timeline. At the end of this period, the observer nation shall either proceed to full membership or withdraw from observer status.

Article 11 — The Civic Admission Panel

1. Membership applications shall be assessed by the Civic Admission Panel, composed of twelve residents drawn by sortition from the existing signatory nations, no more than one from each nation, serving a single non-renewable term of eighteen months.
2. The Panel shall assess compliance with Article 9 criteria using evidence submitted by the applicant nation, independent assessments commissioned from bodies with no institutional relationship to existing member nations, and testimony from residents of the applicant nation selected by sortition.
3. Panel recommendations are advisory to the Civic Assembly of Nations. The Assembly may reject a positive recommendation only by consensus, and may accept a negative recommendation only by simple majority. No admission proceeds without affirmative Assembly resolution.

Article 12 — Equal Standing of All Member Nations

1. All signatory nations hold equal standing under this Compact regardless of population, territory, economic output, or any other measure of national scale. No weighted voting, permanent membership, or veto right based on national characteristics is permitted.
2. Decision-making procedures are specified in Part III and Part IV of this Compact. No deviation from those procedures that advantages larger or more powerful nations is permissible.

Article 13 — Suspension

1. A signatory nation may be suspended from participation in Compact decision-making if it demonstrably ceases to meet the eligibility criteria of Article 9, following assessment by the Civic Admission Panel and affirmative vote of three-quarters of the remaining signatory assemblies.
2. Suspension does not remove a nation's obligations under agreements already ratified, nor does it affect the rights of residents of the suspended nation to access the Civic Memory Archive or submit observations to the Civic Integrity Inspectorate.
3. Suspension shall be reviewed every six months and lifted automatically upon certification by the Civic Admission Panel that DD&SA eligibility criteria have been restored.

PART III — INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Chapter 3: The Civic Assembly of Nations

Article 14 — Establishment and Purpose

1. The Civic Assembly of Nations (CAN) is the primary deliberative body of this Compact. It is the forum in which resident-delegates from signatory nations deliberate, propose, and vote on matters within the enumerated coordination domains.
2. The CAN does not govern. It coordinates. It does not legislate for member nations. It proposes coordinated measures which become binding only upon ratification by the national sortition assemblies of individual member nations.
3. The CAN operates by the logic of popular sovereignty: its authority derives from the residents it represents, not from any international legal order, and it ceases to represent those residents the moment its proceedings depart from the deliberative principles established in this Compact.

Article 15 — Composition of the Civic Assembly of Nations

1. Each signatory nation shall appoint to the CAN a delegation of five resident-delegates, selected by sortition from its national resident pool using the same selection protocols as those used for the national sortition assembly.
2. CAN delegates must be ordinary residents at the time of selection. Serving members of any national sortition assembly, any government executive body, any political party, or any corporate board are ineligible.
3. CAN delegate terms shall be two years, non-renewable. No resident may serve as a CAN delegate more than once in any ten-year period. Terms are staggered within each national delegation: three delegates shall be appointed in the first year and two in the second, ensuring continuity without entrenchment.
4. Delegates remain subject to the mandate instructions of their national sortition assembly. They are not free agents: they carry mandated positions and report their deliberations in full to their national assembly. Any delegate who votes contrary to their national assembly's mandate without prior authorisation shall be recalled immediately.
5. Delegates receive reasonable subsistence support covering accommodation, travel, and a living stipend equivalent to the median national wage of their home country. No additional remuneration is payable. The purpose is to ensure that service as a delegate does not impose hardship, not to create financial incentives for the position.

Article 16 — Deliberative Procedures of the CAN

1. All deliberations of the CAN are moderated by a Panel of Three Moderators, selected by sortition from residents of non-member observer nations or, where no such nations exist, from retired national sortition assembly moderators of member nations. Moderators serve single non-renewable terms of twelve months.
2. Deliberation shall proceed in three mandatory phases for any substantive matter:
 - (a) Information Phase: all delegations receive, in writing, the full epistemic briefing prepared by the International Epistemic Commission, including the Mandated Challenge Assessment. No deliberation may commence before every delegation has confirmed receipt and minimum review time of forty-eight hours.
 - (b) Deliberation Phase: open structured debate in which each delegation speaks to the evidence, raises objections, and proposes amendments. The Moderators ensure equal time allocation and prevent the domination of proceedings by any delegation or bloc.
 - (c) Mandate Consultation Phase: a minimum pause of seventy-two hours between the close of deliberation and any binding vote, during which delegations consult their national sortition assemblies and receive updated mandate instructions.
3. All deliberations are recorded verbatim, translated into all official languages of signatory nations, published in full within twenty-four hours of their conclusion, and archived permanently in the Civic Memory Archive.
4. No deliberation shall take place in private session except for matters governed by the Security Information Protocol under Article 63. The convening of a private session shall itself be recorded and published.

Article 17 — Voting Thresholds in the CAN

1. Ordinary coordinated measures shall require approval by simple majority of all signatory nation delegations, provided that no more than two signatory nations holding a combined population exceeding twenty-five percent of the total Compact population have formally registered Structural Objection.
2. Coordinated measures classified as Major, defined in Schedule 1 of this Compact as those affecting constitutional rights, economic structures, security arrangements, or environmental obligations, shall require approval by two-thirds supermajority of all signatory nations.
3. Amendments to this Compact shall require unanimous consent of all signatory assemblies. A single non-consenting signatory constitutes a veto on constitutional amendment. This provision may not itself be amended.
4. A Structural Objection is not a veto on deliberation. It triggers a mandatory Mediation Phase under Article 22 before any vote proceeds. Chronic Structural Objection on a recurring matter by the same nation for more than three consecutive sessions shall trigger a Compact Review under Article 56.

Chapter 4: The Sortition Coordinating Council

Article 18 — Establishment and Function

1. The Sortition Coordinating Council (SCC) is the operational coordinating body of this Compact, responsible for implementing the decisions of the CAN between Assembly sessions, maintaining the institutional functions of the Compact, and ensuring that Compact operations remain consistent with its foundational principles.
2. The SCC is not a government. It does not hold legislative or judicial power. It executes the decisions of the CAN, administers the institutional processes of the Compact, and refers all matters requiring decision to the appropriate deliberative body.
3. The SCC shall maintain a published activity log updated not less than weekly, detailing every action taken, every communication sent or received, and every expenditure incurred. This log is a public document accessible to any resident of any signatory nation.

Article 19 — Composition of the SCC

1. The SCC shall consist of one Coordinating Commissioner from each signatory nation, selected by sortition from residents of that nation. Coordinating Commissioners serve a single non-renewable term of three years.
2. The SCC shall elect from among its members a Presiding Commissioner by lot, serving a twelve-month term on a rotating basis. The Presiding Commissioner is not a President or executive: they chair SCC sessions and sign formal communications, and hold no additional authority.
3. Coordinating Commissioners are subject to recall by the sortition assembly of their nation at any time. Recall triggers immediate selection of a replacement by sortition.

Article 20 — Limits on SCC Authority

1. The SCC may not take any action that has not been authorised by prior CAN decision or that falls outside the operational necessities of Compact administration.

2. The SCC may not enter into any agreement, treaty, or protocol with any entity on behalf of the Compact without CAN authorisation.
3. The SCC may not expend funds in excess of its approved operational budget. Any expenditure beyond the approved budget requires emergency CAN authorisation.
4. The SCC may not issue public statements on matters of framework direction without CAN authorisation. Operational communications are permitted; political positions are not.

Chapter 5: The International Epistemic Commission

Article 21 — Purpose and Design

1. The International Epistemic Commission (IEC) is the information architecture of this Compact. Its purpose is to ensure that deliberations in the CAN and ratification processes in national assemblies are based on evidence that has been adversarially tested, pluralistically sourced, and made accessible to ordinary residents.
2. The IEC is constitutionally independent of all signatory governments, all international organisations, and all commercial entities. It receives its mandate from this Compact and is accountable to the CAN and to residents through the Civic Integrity Inspectorate.
3. The IEC embodies the same epistemic principles applied in national DD&SA frameworks: no single paradigm dominates, no expert is permanent, every dominant view is subject to mandated challenge, and all knowledge claims are accessible in plain language to non-expert residents.

Article 22 — Composition and Rotation of the IEC

1. The IEC shall consist of a rotating panel of epistemic practitioners — scientists, statisticians, historians, ethicists, and methodologists — appointed by a competitive open process governed by criteria of methodological expertise, not disciplinary consensus.
2. No IEC member may serve for more than three years. No member may be appointed by, funded by, or hold professional affiliation with any commercial entity during their term.
3. For every principal briefing submitted by the IEC on any matter before the CAN, a Mandated Challenger Assessment must be simultaneously submitted by an independent body with no institutional connection to the principal briefers. The two assessments are submitted together and neither may be suppressed or delayed.
4. A Public Accessibility Office within the IEC shall produce a plain-language summary of every briefing, accessible to non-expert residents of all signatory nations, in all official languages, within seventy-two hours of the expert briefing's submission.

Article 23 — Prohibition on Epistemic Monopoly

1. The IEC is constitutionally prohibited from adopting or endorsing a single analytical framework, economic model, or scientific paradigm as its default. All contested empirical questions must be presented as contested, with the full range of credible positions stated and evidenced.
2. The IEC must actively commission dissenting analysis on all matters of significant consequence. Consensus positions are permitted only where the evidence base is so overwhelming that no credible dissenting position exists. The IEC must justify publicly any claim of such consensus.

3. Any delegation to the CAN that believes the IEC has presented a question as settled that is in fact contested may trigger a Formal Epistemic Review, which suspends the deliberation phase on that matter until an independent review is completed.

Chapter 6: The International Civic Court

Article 24 — Jurisdiction and Limits

1. The International Civic Court (ICC) is the judicial body of this Compact. Its jurisdiction is strictly limited to:

- (a) Disputes between signatory nations arising from the interpretation or application of this Compact.
- (b) Challenges to the constitutional validity of CAN decisions or SCC actions brought by national assemblies.
- (c) Determinations of Compact compliance in membership admission and suspension proceedings.
- (d) Adjudication of capture risk determinations under Article 28 where the Civic Integrity Inspectorate has made a formal referral.

2. The ICC has no jurisdiction over national law, no power to strike down national legislation, and no authority to impose obligations on signatory nations beyond the terms of this Compact. It may not issue advisory opinions or rulings beyond its enumerated jurisdiction.

3. No individual resident may be held liable before the ICC for any act or omission. The ICC adjudicates between institutions and nations, not individuals.

Article 25 — Composition of the ICC

1. The ICC shall consist of nine jurists, selected by open competition on the basis of constitutional expertise, commitment to the principles of this Compact, and demonstrated independence from governmental and commercial interests.

2. Jurists serve a single non-renewable term of six years. Three jurists shall be replaced every two years to ensure continuity. No jurist may be of the same nationality as any other jurist serving concurrently.

3. ICC proceedings are fully public. All submissions, hearings, and judgments are published. Dissenting judgments are published in full alongside majority judgments. Summary judgments accessible to non-legal residents are published alongside technical rulings.

Article 26 — Enforcement of ICC Rulings

1. ICC rulings on Compact interpretation are binding on signatory nations. Compliance is expected within the timeline specified in the ruling. Non-compliance triggers the Compact Review process under Article 56.

2. The ICC has no power to impose financial penalties, trade sanctions, or any coercive measure against a signatory nation. Its authority is interpretive and declaratory. The mechanism of compliance is the civic commitment of member nations, not compulsion.

3. A signatory nation that persistently refuses to comply with ICC rulings may be referred for suspension proceedings under Article 13. The ICC does not make the suspension determination; it refers to the Civic Admission Panel.

Chapter 7: Supporting Bodies

Article 27 — The Coordinating Secretariat

1. The Coordinating Secretariat provides the administrative and logistical functions required for Compact institutions to operate. It is explicitly not a governance body.
2. The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General appointed by the SCC for a single non-renewable term of four years. The Secretary-General is an administrative officer, not a political representative.
3. Secretariat staffing shall be kept to the operationally necessary minimum. No Secretariat post shall be designated permanent. Maximum post duration is five years, after which the function must be re-competed.

Article 28 — The Civic Integrity Inspectorate

1. The Civic Integrity Inspectorate (CII) monitors all Compact institutions for compliance with the foundational principles of this Compact, with particular attention to the prohibition on elite capture under Article 4.
2. The CII is composed of twelve residents selected by sortition — two from each of six randomly selected signatory nations, rotating annually. No resident may serve on the CII more than once in any eight-year period.
3. The CII operates independently of all other Compact institutions. It may not be directed, briefed, or influenced by any Compact institution in the conduct of its inspections. It reports directly to the residents of all signatory nations through its quarterly public reports.
4. The CII may refer matters to the ICC, recommend suspension proceedings to the Civic Admission Panel, and publish findings on any Compact institution without restriction. Its findings may not be suppressed by any Compact body or signatory government.

Article 29 — The International Civic Mediation Service

1. The International Civic Mediation Service (ICMS) provides structured mediation for disputes between signatory nations or delegations that have not reached the threshold for ICC adjudication.
2. Mediation is mandatory before any matter proceeds to ICC adjudication, unless the ICC determines that mediation is inapplicable to the nature of the dispute.
3. Mediators are drawn from a roster maintained by the IEC, consisting of residents with demonstrated expertise in deliberative facilitation and no institutional affiliation to the disputing parties.

Article 30 — The Civic Dignity Review Panel

1. The Civic Dignity Review Panel (CDRP) assesses all proposed binding measures against the Maslow Compact Constraint established in Article 5.2. It is composed of six residents selected by sortition, serving eighteen-month terms.
2. The CDRP must complete its assessment before any proposed measure proceeds to national ratification. A negative CDRP assessment triggers a mandatory sixty-day review period during which the proposal must be modified to address the identified dignity concerns before ratification proceeds.

3. The CDRP assessment must include the specific evidence base on which its determination rests, the nations and populations most likely to be affected, and the modifications required to bring the proposal into compliance with the Maslow Compact Constraint.

Article 31 — The International Civic Learning Programme

1. The International Civic Learning Programme (ICLP) supports residents of all signatory and observer nations in developing the knowledge and analytical capacity required for effective participation in DD&SA governance.

2. The ICLP maintains publicly accessible curricula covering: the principles of sortition and deliberative democracy; the structure of this Compact; the rights of residents under their national DD&SA framework; the methodology of adversarial epistemics; and the history of democratic and proto-democratic institutions.

3. ICLP resources are free, open-access, translated into all languages of signatory nations, and adapted for residents with varying levels of prior political engagement. No ICLP resource may promote any particular political position or be developed by any body with a commercial interest in the content.

Article 32 — The Civic Memory Archive

1. The Civic Memory Archive (CMA) is the permanent institutional memory of this Compact. It holds verbatim records of all CAN deliberations, all SCC activity logs, all ICC proceedings, all IEC briefings, all CII reports, and all CDRP assessments from the inception of the Compact.

2. The CMA is a public archive accessible to every resident of every signatory and observer nation without registration, fee, or restriction. It is maintained in multiple independent redundant formats to prevent loss.

3. No record may be removed from the CMA. Records may be annotated with corrections or contextual updates, but the original record must remain visible alongside any annotation.

PART IV — DECISION-MAKING MECHANISMS

Chapter 8: From Deliberation to Ratification

Article 33 — The Decision Pathway

1. All decisions under this Compact follow the same mandatory pathway, adapted for urgency as specified in Article 62:

(a) Proposal origination by any signatory national assembly, by the SCC acting on mandate from a previous CAN session, or by a qualified petition of two or more national assemblies.

(b) IEC epistemic briefing and Mandated Challenger Assessment, submitted simultaneously at least fourteen days before deliberation commences.

(c) CDRP dignity assessment completed and published at least seven days before deliberation commences.

(d) Deliberation in the CAN under the three-phase procedure of Article 16.

(e) Vote in the CAN at the applicable threshold under Article 17.

(f) Transmission to national sortition assemblies for individual ratification.

(g) Entry into force upon ratification by the minimum number of national assemblies specified in the measure's classification.

2. No measure classified as Major under Schedule 1 enters into force for any nation that has not individually ratified it. Silence, abstention, or failure to convene a ratification session does not constitute implied consent.

3. The ratification period for each national assembly shall be no less than sixty days for Ordinary measures and no less than one hundred and twenty days for Major measures, measured from the date of transmission.

Article 34 — National Assembly Mandate Instructions

1. Before any CAN deliberation, each signatory national assembly shall issue a Mandate Instruction to its delegation. The Mandate Instruction specifies:

(a) The assembly's informed position on the matter under deliberation.

(b) The conditions under which the delegation may vote in favour, against, or abstain.

(c) The conditions under which the delegation is authorised to accept amendments proposed during deliberation.

(d) The conditions under which the delegation is required to invoke Structural Objection under Article 17.

2. Mandate Instructions shall be published. A resident of any signatory nation may read the Mandate Instruction issued by any national assembly, including those other than their own.

3. Where a delegation votes contrary to its Mandate Instruction without prior authorisation from its national assembly, the vote shall be registered but flagged for national assembly review. The national assembly may within fourteen days submit a formal objection to the CAN record, which is binding on the record but does not retrospectively alter the vote count.

Article 35 — Post-Decision Outcome Review

1. All binding coordinated measures shall be subject to mandatory Post-Decision Outcome Review, conducted not less than two years and not more than five years after entry into force.

2. The Outcome Review shall assess whether the measure achieved its stated objectives, whether it produced unintended consequences, whether it imposed hardship on residents of any signatory nation not anticipated at the time of deliberation, and whether it should be continued, modified, or repealed.

3. Outcome Reviews are conducted by a panel convened by the IEC with independent membership. Their findings are published and transmitted to all national assemblies. A negative finding triggers a mandatory CAN deliberation on the measure within ninety days.

4. Any signatory nation may withdraw from a binding measure if the Outcome Review demonstrates that the measure has produced material harm to its residents. Such withdrawal does not constitute a general challenge to the Compact.

PART V — SOVEREIGNTY PROTECTIONS

Chapter 9: The Architecture of Protected Sovereignty

Article 36 — Reserved Sovereign Domains

1. The following domains are reserved exclusively to national sortition assemblies and are entirely outside the jurisdiction of this Compact. No Compact institution may deliberate, advise, or make recommendations on any matter within a reserved sovereign domain:

(a) Constitutional structure of national governance, including the design of sortition mechanisms, eligibility criteria for civic service, rotation schedules, and deliberative procedures.

(b) Criminal law, civil law, family law, property law, and all matters of domestic legal governance.

(c) National cultural policy, language policy, education curriculum, and the structure of national public institutions.

(d) Land use, planning, housing, and domestic infrastructure investment.

(e) National healthcare system design, social security architecture, and the structure of welfare provision.

(f) National monetary policy, domestic taxation, and the allocation of public expenditure within national budgets.

(g) National defence capability and force structure, except under the collective security arrangements of Part VI.

(h) National religious and philosophical affairs.

2. Any Compact decision that purports to affect a reserved sovereign domain is void. Any signatory nation may bring a challenge under Article 24 against any Compact decision it believes encroaches on its reserved sovereign domain.

Article 37 — The Sovereignty Impact Assessment

1. Before any proposed measure proceeds to CAN deliberation, the Coordinating Secretariat shall conduct a Sovereignty Impact Assessment identifying whether the measure could affect any reserved sovereign domain of any signatory nation.

2. Where any potential sovereignty impact is identified, the affected nation shall be notified and given the opportunity to submit a written sovereignty objection to the CAN before deliberation commences.

3. A sovereignty objection triggers a mandatory Sovereignty Review by the ICC before deliberation may proceed. The ICC may determine that the sovereignty impact is real, in which case the measure is modified or abandoned, or that the sovereignty impact is absent, in which case deliberation resumes.

Article 38 — Interaction with External Bodies

1. This Compact shall not affiliate with, subordinate itself to, or be bound by the decisions of any existing intergovernmental organisation, including the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, or any other body not constituted under DD&SA principles.

2. Engagement with external bodies is permitted for specific, limited purposes of information exchange, mutual recognition, or coordinated action on matters of clear shared interest, subject to the following conditions:

- (a)** Every engagement must be specifically authorised by a CAN resolution.
- (b)** No engagement may create binding obligations on Compact members without full ratification through national assemblies.
- (c)** External representatives of non-DD&SA bodies may not participate in Compact deliberations except as regulated witnesses presenting evidence under adversarial conditions.
- (d)** Commercial entities may never be engaged as institutional partners of this Compact, and may not participate in any Compact process except as regulated witnesses providing technical evidence when specifically requested by the IEC.

PART VI — DOMAINS OF COORDINATION

Chapter 10: Climate and Environmental Coordination

Article 39 — The Climate Compact Protocol

1. Signatory nations shall coordinate on climate and environmental policy through the Climate Compact Protocol (CCP), a standing sub-framework of this Compact with its own deliberative schedule, measurable targets, and enforcement architecture.
2. The CCP is governed by the principle that environmental commitments made through deliberative resident assemblies are more durable, more ambitious, and more democratically legitimate than those made through intergovernmental negotiation. The empirical record of citizens' assemblies on climate confirms this principle and it informs the design of all CCP mechanisms.
3. CCP commitments are set by the CAN on the basis of IEC scientific briefings, Mandated Challenger Assessments, and evidence from national sortition assemblies on resident-deliberated environmental priorities. They are ratified by national assemblies. They are not set by executive governments, external bodies, or industrial interests.
4. The Climate Monitoring and Accountability Office, established within the IEC under this Article, shall maintain independently verified, publicly accessible data on:
 - (a)** Greenhouse gas emissions of each signatory nation, measured by independently verified methodologies.
 - (b)** Progress against each nation's CCP commitments, updated quarterly.
 - (c)** The aggregate emissions trajectory of the Compact as a whole.
 - (d)** Ecological health indicators across the territories of signatory nations.
5. No CCP commitment shall be set by reference to the commercial interests of any industry operating in signatory nations. Industrial evidence may be submitted as regulated witness testimony under adversarial conditions. It carries no institutional weight beyond what the IEC independently verifies.

Article 40 — Environmental Mutual Assistance

1. Signatory nations shall provide mutual assistance in response to environmental crises — wildfires, floods, droughts, pollution events — occurring within the territory of any member nation, subject to the requesting nation's consent and the operational capacity of assisting nations.

2. A standing Environmental Mutual Assistance Register shall be maintained by the SCC, listing the resources, expertise, and response capacity that each signatory nation has committed to make available on request.

Chapter 11: Technology Governance

Article 41 — The Technology Deliberation Framework

1. Signatory nations recognise that artificial intelligence, biotechnology, synthetic biology, surveillance infrastructure, and other rapidly developing technologies present governance challenges whose cross-border character exceeds the capacity of any single nation to address.

2. The Technology Deliberation Framework (TDF) provides the structure through which signatory nations coordinate on:

(a) Standards and safeguards for AI systems used in governance, public services, and critical infrastructure.

(b) Biosafety and biosecurity standards for technologies capable of affecting human health or ecological systems.

(c) Privacy, surveillance, and data governance standards affecting residents across multiple jurisdictions.

(d) Interoperability standards for digital public infrastructure.

(e) Protocols governing the development and deployment of autonomous systems in security contexts.

3. All TDF deliberations must include mandatory technical literacy briefings designed for non-expert residents, produced by the IEC's Public Accessibility Office, before any national assembly ratification process begins. The complexity of a technology is not a justification for circumventing resident deliberation; it is a call for superior epistemic support.

4. No technology governance standard coordinated under the TDF shall be designed to advantage the products, services, or market position of any commercial entity. Independent technical assessment that demonstrates such advantage is grounds for immediate suspension of the standard pending redesign.

Article 42 — The Civic Technology Ethics Commission

1. A standing Civic Technology Ethics Commission (CTEC) shall operate within the IEC, composed of ethicists, technologists, and resident representatives drawn by sortition, none serving for more than three years.

2. The CTEC shall assess all proposed technology standards against the human dignity constraint of Article 5, with particular attention to:

(a) Technologies capable of mass surveillance of residents without consent.

(b) Technologies capable of autonomous harm to persons without human deliberation.

(c) Technologies capable of concentrating economic, informational, or political power beyond the reach of sortition accountability.

(d) Technologies deployed in ways that diminish residents' capacity for autonomous reasoning or self-determination.

3. A negative CTEC assessment does not automatically block a proposed standard, but it triggers a mandatory Major classification under Schedule 1 and the associated two-thirds supermajority requirement.

Chapter 12: Trade and Economic Coordination

Article 43 — Principles of Civic Trade

1. Trade between signatory nations shall be governed by the principle of civic benefit: that trade is legitimate insofar as it improves the material conditions, economic opportunity, and productive autonomy of ordinary residents in participating nations, and not merely insofar as it generates aggregate output or corporate profit.

2. Trade standards coordinated under this Compact shall apply the Maslow Compact Constraint: no trade arrangement may be adopted if credible evidence indicates that it will reduce the capacity of any signatory nation to meet the subsistence, welfare, or security needs of its residents.

3. The CAN may coordinate on trade facilitation — mutual recognition of standards, reduced procedural barriers, and cross-border economic cooperation. It may not negotiate binding trade rules that constrain national sortition assemblies from adopting public policy measures required to meet civic obligations.

Article 44 — Economic Mutual Aid

1. Signatory nations shall maintain a Civic Economic Solidarity Fund, constituted by proportional contributions from each member nation, providing concessional assistance to signatory nations experiencing acute economic disruption.

2. Access to the Solidarity Fund is conditional solely on:

(a) Demonstrated need assessed by the IEC.

(b) A transition plan presented by the requesting nation's sortition assembly.

(c) Continued compliance with the membership criteria of Article 9.

3. Solidarity Fund assistance carries no conditionality relating to economic policy. The requesting nation's sortition assembly retains full authority over its economic governance. Fund assistance is in the nature of civic mutual aid, not structural adjustment.

Chapter 13: Pandemic and Health Security

Article 45 — The Health Resilience Protocol

1. Signatory nations shall coordinate on public health security through the Health Resilience Protocol (HRP), covering:

(a) Mutual early-warning systems for emerging infectious disease, with mandatory transparent data sharing within seventy-two hours of threshold event identification.

(b) Coordinated strategic reserves of essential medical supplies, pharmaceutical ingredients, and personal protective equipment.

(c) Mutual assistance in medical surge capacity during declared public health emergencies.

(d) Shared research and development on diseases of common concern, with research outputs publicly accessible and not subject to intellectual property restrictions that limit resident access.

(e) Coordinated protocols for border management and population movement during public health emergencies.

2. HRP measures are implemented through national public health authorities acting on the mandate of national sortition assemblies. No Compact institution has authority to override national public health decisions, mandate health interventions on residents of any nation, or impose emergency health measures without national assembly ratification.

3. Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical device companies shall not participate in HRP governance processes. Their technical evidence may be submitted through the IEC's regulated witness process. All evidence submitted by commercial entities to the IEC is published in full.

Chapter 14: Collective Security

Article 46 — The Civic Security Compact

1. Signatory nations recognise that the security of each DD&SA nation is a matter of collective concern, because the coercive destabilisation or military threat to one member weakens the conditions of civic self-governance for all.

2. The Civic Security Compact (CSC) is a mutual defence framework with the following character:

(a) It is strictly defensive. No CSC mechanism may be used to project force beyond the territory of signatory nations for offensive purposes.

(b) It operates by mutual consultation, not automatic obligation. No signatory nation is automatically committed to military action by the activation of the CSC.

(c) Military assistance under the CSC requires a specific ratification by the assisting nation's national sortition assembly. Executive governments may not commit forces without assembly mandate.

(d) Intelligence sharing under the CSC is subject to the Security Information Protocol of Article 63 and may not be used for any purpose beyond the defence of member nations.

3. The CSC explicitly prohibits the following:

(a) Military intervention in the internal affairs of any nation, including non-member nations, except in response to a direct armed attack on a signatory nation.

(b) The use of CSC structures or resources for economic coercion, regime change, or the advancement of any commercial interest.

(c) The creation of a standing international military command with authority over the armed forces of any signatory nation.

(d) The deployment of autonomous lethal systems without direct human oversight and national assembly mandate.

4. The CSC operates through a Security Coordination Cell of national defence representatives, who share threat intelligence, coordinate border security, and manage mutual assistance logistics. The Cell has no independent command authority and no budget beyond operational administration.

Chapter 15: Information and Epistemic Governance

Article 47 — The International Information Integrity Framework

1. Signatory nations recognise that the capacity of residents to deliberate as sortition assembly members depends on the integrity of the information environment, and that cross-border information flows — social media platforms, international broadcasting, AI-generated content — affect the epistemic conditions in which domestic deliberation takes place.
2. The International Information Integrity Framework (IIIF) coordinates standards for:
 - (a) Mandatory disclosure of the origin, funding, and algorithmic amplification of politically relevant content distributed across the territories of signatory nations.
 - (b) Standards for identifying and labelling AI-generated political content.
 - (c) Mutual recognition of platforms' obligations to provide accurate algorithmic transparency data to national regulators.
 - (d) Coordinated responses to state-sponsored information operations targeting sortition assembly processes.
3. The IIIF shall not be used as a mechanism for content regulation, political censorship, or the suppression of dissent. Its sole purpose is transparency of origin and mechanism, not restriction of expression. Any IIIF measure that would restrict residents' access to information requires unanimous national assembly consent and is subject to mandatory ICC review.

PART VII — ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY

Chapter 16: The Full Accountability Architecture

Article 48 — Residents as Primary Accountability Holders

1. The primary accountability mechanism of this Compact is the resident. Every institution, every decision, every expenditure, and every personnel appointment under this Compact is subject to civic scrutiny, civic challenge, and civic correction.
2. Every resident of every signatory nation holds the following rights under this Compact:
 - (a) The right to access all Compact documents, records, and activity logs in the Civic Memory Archive without restriction.
 - (b) The right to submit observations, complaints, or evidence to the Civic Integrity Inspectorate.
 - (c) The right to submit a Formal Epistemic Review request through their national sortition assembly.
 - (d) The right to participate in the International Civic Learning Programme.
 - (e) The right to observe all non-security deliberations of the CAN in real time.

Article 49 — Financial Accountability

1. All Compact finances shall be managed under a strict framework of public transparency:
 - (a) The Compact's annual budget shall be approved by the CAN and published in itemised form accessible to ordinary residents.

(b) All expenditures above a threshold set by the CAN shall be individually published within fourteen days of transaction.

(c) An independent annual audit shall be conducted by auditors selected by sortition from residents of non-member observer nations or, where unavailable, from residents of member nations not employed in any Compact institution.

(d) Audit findings are published in full within sixty days of audit completion.

(e) No Compact funds may be transferred to any commercial entity except for specific, publicly authorised operational services at market rates, with no long-term dependency relationships.

Article 50 — Personnel Accountability

1. All individuals exercising authority under this Compact — delegates, commissioners, secretariat staff, jurists, moderators, and inspectors — are individually accountable for their conduct under the Civic Conduct Protocol.

2. The Civic Conduct Protocol requires that all Compact personnel:

(a) Disclose all financial interests, professional affiliations, and personal connections that could constitute a conflict of interest with their Compact role.

(b) Recuse themselves from any deliberation or decision in which they have a conflict of interest.

(c) Refrain from seeking or accepting employment with any entity whose affairs they have directly influenced during their Compact service, for a period of three years after the conclusion of that service.

(d) Make no undisclosed communication with external parties on matters under their Compact authority.

3. Violations of the Civic Conduct Protocol are investigated by the Civic Integrity Inspectorate and published. Serious violations are referred to the national sortition assembly of the individual concerned.

Article 51 — Institutional Performance Review

1. Each Compact institution shall undergo a comprehensive performance review every three years, conducted by a resident panel of twelve, selected by sortition from signatory nations not represented in the institution under review.

2. Performance reviews assess whether the institution is achieving its stated purpose, operating within its constitutional limits, maintaining its epistemic independence, resisting capture, and operating with appropriate efficiency of resource use.

3. Performance review findings are transmitted to the CAN and published. The CAN may, in response to a negative finding, restructure, constrain, or dissolve an institution by supermajority resolution.

Article 52 — Sanctions for Capture

1. Where the Civic Integrity Inspectorate determines that a Compact institution has been subject to capture within the meaning of Article 4, the following graduated responses apply:

(a) Level 1 — Published Warning: the finding and the identified mechanism of capture are published in the CII quarterly report.

(b) Level 2 — Operational Suspension: the affected institutional function is suspended pending restructuring of the capture mechanism.

(c) Level 3 — Personnel Change: all personnel associated with the captured function are removed and replaced by emergency sortition.

(d) Level 4 — Institutional Dissolution: the institution is dissolved and its functions redesigned under mandatory CAN deliberation.

2. The CII determines the level of response. The CAN may escalate but not de-escalate a CII determination within the same review cycle.

PART VIII — EMERGENCY PROVISIONS

Chapter 17: Crisis Response Architecture

Article 53 — The Emergency Coordination Protocol

1. Signatory nations recognise that certain emergencies — acute military threats, pandemic outbreaks, catastrophic environmental events, or cascading economic crises — demand a coordinated response faster than the ordinary deliberative timelines of this Compact permit.

2. The Emergency Coordination Protocol (ECP) provides expedited coordination pathways that preserve the essential accountability architecture of this Compact under conditions of urgency. The ECP is not a mechanism for bypassing democratic mandate; it is a mechanism for accelerating its exercise.

3. The ECP may be invoked by the SCC acting on a request from any two or more national sortition assemblies, or by unanimous SCC determination that a threshold emergency condition has been met.

Article 54 — Emergency Deliberation Procedures

1. Under the ECP, the ordinary timeline of Article 33 is modified as follows:

(a) The IEC epistemic briefing is reduced to a minimum of six hours, provided simultaneously to all delegations electronically.

(b) The CDRP dignity assessment is conducted concurrently with IEC briefing preparation and completed within the same six-hour window.

(c) The CAN deliberation phase is reduced to a minimum of four hours of structured real-time deliberation with all delegations present by secure remote means if necessary.

(d) The Mandate Consultation Phase is reduced to a minimum of twelve hours.

(e) The national ratification period is reduced to a minimum of seventy-two hours.

2. Emergency measures approved under the ECP are provisional for a period not exceeding thirty days. At the end of thirty days, the measure either lapses or proceeds through the ordinary deliberative pathway for permanent adoption.

3. The power of the ECP is strictly limited to the emergency at hand. It does not confer general emergency authority on any Compact institution. Any ECP action that purports to exercise authority beyond the specific emergency is void.

Article 55 — Limits on Emergency Authority

1. Regardless of the nature or severity of an emergency, the following provisions may never be suspended or modified under the ECP:

- (a) The right of any signatory nation to withdraw from this Compact under Article 8.
- (b) The prohibition on corporate participation in Compact decision-making under Article 4.
- (c) The reserved sovereign domains of Article 36.
- (d) The publication requirements of Article 6.
- (e) The resident rights of Article 48.

2. An emergency does not suspend the Compact's constitution; it tests it. The measure of a constitutional framework is whether it upholds its foundational principles under the greatest pressure, not merely in conditions of comfortable normality.

PART IX — CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AND AMENDMENT

Chapter 18: Integrity Over Time

Article 56 — The Compact Review Process

1. A comprehensive review of this Compact shall be conducted every ten years from the date of initial entry into force. The review shall assess whether the Compact continues to serve its foundational purposes, whether its institutional architecture remains fit, whether new domains of coordination have become necessary, and whether any provisions require clarification or modification.
2. The Review shall be conducted by a Residents' Review Commission composed of three residents selected by sortition from each signatory nation, serving a single non-renewable eighteen-month term. The Commission has no authority to amend the Compact; it has authority to recommend amendments for consideration by the CAN.
3. The Review process shall include a formal Residents' Consultation period of not less than six months, during which residents of all signatory nations are invited to submit observations, evidence, and proposals to the Commission.
4. Review Commission recommendations are transmitted to national sortition assemblies before CAN deliberation. A recommendation that no national assembly has considered within the applicable period is returned to the Commission for revision.

Article 57 — Amendment Procedures

1. This Compact may be amended by the following procedure only:
 - (a) Amendment proposals originating from a minimum of one-third of all signatory national assemblies, or from the Residents' Review Commission.
 - (b) IEC assessment of the implications of the proposed amendment, including Mandated Challenge Assessment.
 - (c) CAN deliberation over a minimum period of ninety days.
 - (d) Unanimous consent of all signatory national assemblies following a minimum ratification period of one hundred and eighty days.

2. Part I of this Compact — the Foundational Principles — may not be amended by any procedure. The foundational principles express the constitutional identity of the Compact. Their modification would constitute the creation of a new and different instrument, which requires founding from first principles rather than amendment of this one.

3. The right of withdrawal under Article 8 may never be amended or constrained.

PART X — PROTOCOLS AND SCHEDULES

Chapter 19: Security Information Protocol

Article 58 — Scope and Limits of Security Information Handling

1. This Compact recognises that certain categories of information relating to collective security, active operational intelligence, and military capabilities require handling procedures that deviate from the general publication requirements of Article 6. This Protocol establishes the minimum departure from full transparency consistent with genuine security requirements.

2. Security information handling under this Protocol applies only to:

(a) Active intelligence on specific threats to the territorial integrity or physical safety of signatory nation residents.

(b) Operational details of coordinated security responses that would be materially compromised by publication.

(c) Personal identification information of residents engaged in national security functions.

3. Security classification may not be applied to:

(a) Framework decisions about the scope, purpose, or direction of collective security activity.

(b) Financial data on security expenditure, except specific operational line items.

(c) Decisions that affect the civil liberties, surveillance exposure, or fundamental rights of residents.

(d) Any information that has been classified for the primary purpose of avoiding political accountability.

4. All security classifications shall be reviewed by the Civic Integrity Inspectorate at intervals not exceeding six months. Classifications that are not renewed by a formal determination are automatically declassified. The existence of a classification — though not its content — is always public.

Article 59 — The Security Oversight Panel

1. A Security Oversight Panel of six residents, selected by sortition from signatory nations and holding appropriate clearances under national procedures, shall oversee the application of security classification in Compact contexts.

2. The Panel may review any classified Compact material and may challenge any classification before the ICC. It may not itself declassify material below Level 3 of sensitivity, but it must publish a quarterly report describing the volume, subject areas, and age of classified materials it has reviewed.

Chapter 20: Financial Architecture

Article 60 — The Compact Budget

1. The Compact shall be funded by annual contributions from signatory nations calculated on a modified per-capita basis adjusted for national income levels, ensuring that smaller and lower-income nations are not structurally disadvantaged by membership costs.

2. The budget formula is:

Annual contribution = (Resident Population / Total Compact Population) × Base Budget, adjusted by a Solidarity Factor calculated as the inverse ratio of national median income to Compact median income, not exceeding 2.0× or falling below 0.5×.

3. The budget formula itself may be modified only by unanimous consent of all signatory assemblies.

4. No signatory nation may be expelled or suspended solely for financial arrears. Arrears trigger mediation under the ICMS. Persistent arrears beyond eighteen months are addressed through the Compact Review process.

Chapter 21: Schedule 1 — Classification of Measures

The following classification framework governs deliberation and ratification requirements:

Chapter 22: Schedule 2 — Enumerated Coordination Domains

This Compact confers coordinating authority in the following domains only. All other matters are reserved to signatory nations.

PART XI — ENTRY INTO FORCE AND CLOSING PROVISIONS

Article 61 — Entry into Force

1. This Compact enters into force upon ratification by the national sortition assemblies of a minimum of three eligible nations. It shall remain open for accession by additional nations indefinitely thereafter.

2. Upon entry into force, the founding signatory nations shall convene the inaugural session of the Civic Assembly of Nations within ninety days for the purpose of selecting initial institutional personnel, adopting operational procedures, and setting the initial coordination agenda.

Article 62 — Authentic Texts

1. This Compact is authentic in the official languages of all founding signatory nations. All authentic texts are of equal standing. In the event of discrepancy, the version that most closely reflects the deliberative intent expressed in the founding CAN sessions, as recorded in the Civic Memory Archive, shall prevail.

Article 63 — Definitions

1. Unless context otherwise requires, in this Compact:

(a) 'Signatory Nation' means any nation whose national sortition assembly has ratified this Compact and whose membership has not been suspended under Article 13.

(b) 'National Sortition Assembly' means the primary resident legislative body constituted by lot under a nation's DD&SA constitutional framework.

(c) 'Ordinary Resident' means any adult resident of a signatory nation who is neither a serving member of a national sortition assembly nor holding any Compact institutional position at the time of reference.

(d) 'Mandate Instruction' means the formal instruction issued by a national sortition assembly to its CAN delegation setting out its deliberated position on a matter before the CAN.

(e) 'Structural Objection' means a formal objection registered by a signatory nation's delegation to a proposed CAN measure on the grounds that it threatens the structural integrity of that nation's DD&SA framework or violates the reserved sovereign domains of Article 36.

(f) 'Capture' means the acquisition of undue influence over a Compact institution's decisions or agenda by any entity — commercial, governmental, or personal — in a manner inconsistent with the foundational principles of this Compact.

'We do not turn time back; we move forward with the wisdom its patterns reveal.' — Ian R. Graham, 2026

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